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 i 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation advances the capability of water infrastructure utilities to 
anticipate and adapt to vulnerabilities in their systems from temperature increase and 
interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. Impact assessment models of 
increased heat and interdependencies were developed which incorporate probability, 
spatial, temporal, and operational information. Key findings from the models are that 
with increased heat the increased likelihood of water quality non-compliances is 
particularly concerning, the anticipated increases in different hardware components 
generate different levels of concern starting with iron pipes, then pumps, and then PVC 
pipes, the effects of temperature increase on hardware components and on service losses 
are non-linear due to spatial criticality of components, and that modeling spatial and 
operational complexity helps to identify potential pathways of failure propagation 
between infrastructure systems. Exploring different parameters of the models allowed for 
comparison of institutional strategies.  Key findings are that either preventative 
maintenance or repair strategies can completely offset additional outages from increased 
temperatures though-- improved repair times reduce overall duration of outages more 
than preventative maintenance, and that coordinated strategies across utilities could be 
effective for mitigating vulnerability.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Extreme weather events anticipated from climate change present major challenges for 
our society in the Anthropocene.1 One challenge is in managing the vulnerability of civil 
infrastructure systems which were originally designed to operate under historical weather 
conditions.2 Designs for historical weather conditions create the potential for climate-
related extreme events to increase damages and loss of life. For example, in the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, poor building codes were identified to be a main factor for the 
resulting displacement of 1.2 million people and more than 200,000 deaths.3 The World 
Risk Report states generally that “[Haiti’s] vulnerability to disasters and its ability to 
cope with them are down to far more than simple geography. The disaster potential we 
see in Haiti… is not only driven by the strength of the hazard, but also by the real lack of 
coping capacity and very high fragility and susceptibility within society – we’re talking 
very basic infrastructure – sanitation, healthcare centers and evacuation shelters”.4 
Engineers must adapt infrastructure systems to ensure reliability into the future. The 
American Society of Civil Engineers recognizes that “engineers should develop a new 
paradigm for engineering practice in a world in which climate is changing”.2 Part of this 
new paradigm will be to identify and explore vulnerabilities and prevent them from 
causing infrastructure failure or the cascading of failure to service losses. Without 
adaptation, increasing failures and service outages can occur without the means to 
properly respond.5 
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1.2 Climate Change Hazards for Water Infrastructure 
Water distribution systems are one of the most critical infrastructure systems for 
the economic health of cities and they are vulnerable to climate hazards.6 The delivery of 
safe and sufficient water to residents and commercial establishments is vital to almost all 
residential, commercial, industrial, and public operations. Therefore, disruption of this 
service from disasters is a threat to public and economic health. The overall reliability is 
dependent upon both the availability of the resource, the reliability of the infrastructure, 
and the quality of the water 7 and each are threatened by climate change events. Extreme 
temperatures, drought, frequency of freeze and thaw cycles, extreme precipitation, sea 
level rise, and increased frequency and extent of wildfires pose as hazards for water 
infrastructure.6   
The availability of bulk water resources is sensitive to drought and sea level rise. 
Increased levels of drought causes decreased annual snowfall and precipitation, and sea 
level rise causes saltwater intrusion into groundwater aquifers.8 With simultaneous 
increases in population and reduction of water supply, both surface water and 
groundwater could be insufficient to meet demands in some desert regions.8Additionally, 
increased bulk water temperatures can cause increased growth of pathogens in stagnant 
reservoirs that are difficult to treat at treatment plants.9 
Common elements across all water systems are pumps and pipes which facilitate 
transport, treatment plants, and the operators who manage the infrastructure. Heat 
exposure can cause pumps to overheat and increase corrosion of thermoplastic, metal, 
and concrete materials in canal linings and pipes.10–18 The freezing of water in pipes leads 
to blockages and outages, and an increased frequency of freeze and thaw cycles causes 
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increased cracking of pipes.19–21 In places where temperatures will increase in the winter, 
climate change could beneficially decrease freeze-thaw cycles.22 Additionally, increased 
amounts of standing water and infiltration from extreme precipitation events can cause 
stress loads to underground pipes from soil expansion, causing an increase in cracking.23 
Sea level rise threatens to affect both pumps and pipes along with treatment facilities. 
Salt water intrusion into soil causes increased corrosion and degradation of pipes and 
increased fracturing of pipes from land subsidence. Salt water intrusion could also cause 
flooding of pumping stations, sewers, treatment plants, and wastewater sewage backup.24 
From a human physiological perspective, extreme heat is known to increase water 
demand, and cause heat-stroke in water system operators.25,26 
Each water infrastructure system has additional unique physical, chemical, and 
biological sensitivities to climate change events. Increases in frequency and expanse of 
wildfires can cause erosion, contaminating runoff and resulting in flooding.27 Increases in 
the frequency or intensity of precipitation events are a major risk for these systems 
causing the following potential problems.28 The infrastructure used to transport water to 
treatment plants is at risk to extreme precipitation events and heat exposure. The flooding 
of canals from precipitation and sewer infrastructure failure causes high turbidity and low 
pH levels which could exceed treatment capacity due to the lower-turbidity and higher-
pH design of the treatment processes. This could lead to temporary outages of treated 
water to consumers.29–31 Additionally, concrete canals with jointed panels can breach, 
leading to a shutdown of the larger system.31 The chemical and biological treatment 
processes within water and wastewater treatment plants are sensitive to water temperature 
as well as from levels of turbidity from high precipitation events. Water temperature 
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correlates to the speed of chemical reactions and microbial growth. Higher water 
temperatures are generally beneficial for quickening the speed of reactions and growth of 
microbes that consume organic material and convert harmful chemicals into harmless 
ones.22 If water temperatures become colder the treatment efficiency could be reduced. In 
contrast, increased chemical reaction rates in the distribution system are potentially 
problematic, causing an increased decay of the disinfectant residual, formation of 
disinfection byproducts, nitrification rates, and the growth of harmful bacteria like 
Mycobacterium Avium Complex and Legionella.32,33,42,34–41 
 
1.3 Anticipating Impacts and Adapting Water Distribution Infrastructure  
Though water utilities are largely aware of extreme weather hazards, they are 
challenged by how to adapt their specific systems. In a survey of water utilities, 17 out of 
18 responded that they already experience the extremes attributed to climate change.6 
Most of the 17 utilities experiencing extremes are taking some form of action based on 
the extreme events that have already happened 6. Once utilities identify the causal factors 
of failure within their systems during an extreme weather event, they are able to mitigate 
those factors. While they are acting on recent extremes they have faced, they neglect 
preparations for different future events resulting in planning that lacks foresight. Heyn & 
Winsor state that “A majority of the water and wastewater providers interviewed are 
already experiencing extremes, so convincing employees to prepare for a wider range or 
change in those extremes is difficult for a few of the utilities. Furthermore, there may be 
small, growing changes that accrue before substantial impacts take place, and these are 
hard to garner attention around”.6 Additionally, “ several utilities have experienced dual 
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extreme events with different outcomes – for example drought and flooding. These 
events can result in different impacts to assets and infrastructure and certainly make it 
more challenging for utilities to plan for the future”.6 
Utilities that have not yet experienced extremes have the challenge of identifying any 
vulnerabilities in their system. While they can gain awareness of possible effects of 
extreme weather events that occurred at other utilities, they cannot directly infer that their 
systems are vulnerable in the same way, due to their different infrastructural contexts. 
The outcome of the 2010 earthquake in Chile provides some context. The earthquake was 
larger than the one that occurred in Haiti in the same year, however it produced much less 
damage and loss of life because Chile had stricter building codes.3 Another example  -- 
this time related to water infrastructure -- is that while the City of Phoenix and NYCDEP 
water utilities both face the hazard of extreme precipitation, the City of Phoenix 
anticipates possible water treatment plant shut downs from challenges in treating the high 
turbidity in the water, but NYCDEP does not. NYCDEP draws diversions from a 
different source, redirects high turbidity water, and has an interconnection with other bulk 
water providers.6 Therefore, NYCDEP’s network configuration and water flows make the 
anticipated impacts from extreme events different than those of the City of Phoenix. 
Moreover, the infrastructural context makes anticipating impacts for each utility 
challenging without direct historical experience. 
New federal legislation requires considering context when developing adaptation 
strategies. The American Water Infrastructure Act passed in October 2018 requires US 
utilities to conduct resilience assessments for natural hazards.43 As utilities conduct their 
assessments, they need contextual knowledge for the “Consequence Analysis” and the 
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“Risk and Resilience Management” steps as suggested by the Risk Analysis and 
Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) Standard for Risk and Resilience 
Management of Water and Wastewater Systems, which serves as guidance for 
compliance with the new law.5 The RAMCAP standard calls for an estimation of the 
duration and severity of service outage that could result from a hazard. They also ask that 
utilities “do not assume that all uncontrollable variables and unpredictable events occur 
simultaneously”. 5  Therefore, a contextual knowledge of time and space is recommended 
for anticipating outages.  
Reliability and climate impact assessments can help utilities anticipate impacts, but 
there is room for improvement in the potential of the assessments to capture the 
individual utility contexts. In the water infrastructure field, reliability assessments use 
quantitative methods for assessing a water system’s ability to deliver service given 
scenarios of component failures. These models do not inherently have vulnerability 
assessments to different hazards, however. Climate impact assessments use selected 
methods from reliability assessments to anticipate the increased risks, costs, and/or 
service losses that could occur from a climate change hazard. A review of the types of 
information that were included in a sample of 46 existing reliability and climate change 
impact assessment studies for water treatment and distribution systems is shown in Figure 
1. 6,44,53–62,45,63–72,46,73–77,47–52 
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Figure 1 Types of Contextual Information Included in Water Reliability and 
Climate Impact Assessments 
The types of information were divided into four categories: hardware, spatial, 
temporal, and information regarding explicit impact. Solid colors in Figure 1 represent 
the types of information that were included and each color represents a different climate 
hazards considered. White spaces in the figure indicate types of information that were not 
included in the studies. Studies are arranged chronologically from left to right. The 
overall takeaway is that while most studies aim to characterize potential service losses, 
they use a fraction of the identified types contextual information. The progression of 
studies through time, is promising, however. As time progressed, reliability studies 
included more contextual information (largely spatial and temporal network information) 
and by 2008, climate hazards were introduced. Not all quantitative information available 
in water reliability models has been utilized in climate change assessments. They largely 
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use qualitative assessments of probability and do not use spatial or temporal information. 
The WNTR model from EPA (2017) is a promising reliability assessment tool that 
considers much of the quantitative hardware, spatial, and temporal information as well as 
the ability to input climate hazard information to evaluate service losses.50 Furthermore, 
only a few studies consider connections with other infrastructure networks, long-term 
cumulative effects, and repair dynamics.  
 
1.4 Anticipating and Adapting Water Infrastructure to Impacts from Increased Heat 
Exposure  
In warm regions like the US Southwest, the threat of heat to water reliability is of 
particular concern. It is especially important that water systems remain reliable as 
temperatures rise because in addition to greater consumption by individuals,25 the 
viability of many services may also require increased consumption. The electricity 
generation and agricultural industries in particular may need increasing amounts of water 
in a hotter future.78–80 For individuals, heat exposure can also cause a variety of health 
issues 81 that would be significantly exacerbated without access to clean water. Heat can 
also cause problems for traditionally cold places, but there may also be benefits from 
reducing periods of freezing.19–21 
Anticipating effects from temperature rise and extreme heat events could be improved 
by considering additional types of information than was included in past reliability 
studies. Temporal dynamics are potentially important to consider because degradation 
from heat can accumulate overtime.10–12,17,32,82–84 The two types of climate impact 
assessments that have addressed heat as a hazard to hardware and operations (shown in 
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Figure 1) are climate impact assessment tools48,49,85 and a narrative crafted about the 
possibilities of effects.47 Climate impact assessment tools contain geographically specific 
temperature projections and allow for input of information about component vulnerability 
to heat. They also allow for ranking of the criticality of components but do not help 
determine the vulnerability of failure and their potential to cause outages through 
mapping the network of components. The narrative written about water infrastructure 
vulnerability to heat also includes geographically explicit projection information and 
description of how the components could be vulnerable to failure from heat and 
connections to other infrastructure systems, but no analysis was performed to explore 
possible futures given hardware, spatial, or temporal context of particular water systems.  
Assessments of heat impacts to other infrastructure systems include similar types of 
information to what is included in assessments of heat impacts to water systems (hazard 
information, criticality of components, qualitative component vulnerabilities). 
Assessments for power and transportation systems include additional types of 
information, however. Assessments of heat impacts to power infrastructure include 
additional information characterizing vulnerability of components quantitatively.86–88 
Assessments of roadway infrastructure include the additional information of expert 
rankings of vulnerability and criticality of components.89–91 Moreover, while we know 
that infrastructure hardware are vulnerable, our ability to explore contextual scenarios 
causing service outages is limited.  
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1.5 Understanding and Managing Interdependencies 
Another source of vulnerability of water systems to climate hazards is through their 
interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. Though managed separately, 
infrastructure systems share common space with each other and require one another to 
operate.92 Thus, the vulnerability of one infrastructure system can propagate to other 
infrastructure systems. A key historical example of this propagation is the Baltimore’s 
Howard Street tunnel event where the fire from a derailed freight train caused traffic 
congestion, fiber optic cable damage and telecommunication outage, along with a water 
main break. The water main break then caused flooding of transformers that resulted in 
power outages to 1,200 people in downtown Baltimore.93 Thus, there has been a 
recognized necessity of also considering interdependencies in reliability and climate 
change impact assessments.78,79,99–108,80,109–113,88,93–98 
Power systems are integral to water systems. The two are connected through water 
pumps, valves, and SCADA need for power,7,114 possible load drops from pump failure, 
possible transformer flooding from pipe break,115 and generator capacity drop from lack 
of treated water for cooling.116 Power components are also vulnerable to heat in a variety 
of ways.86 Therefore, exploring the impacts failures have on the coupled system could 
ultimately help understand the overall vulnerability of the coupled systems to heat.  
Current models of interdependencies are insufficient to answer questions about 
propagation and vulnerabilities, however. Reliability and climate change impact 
assessments include quantitative information about interdependencies to better 
understand the strength of connections.47,78,98–107,79,108–113,80,88,93–97 These studies focus on 
long-term use of resources and topographic connections, which do not provide 
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information to determine vulnerability from failure. Current failure propagation 
interdependency studies typically only use graph topologies without flow 
information.96,103,110 Studies suggesting new model frameworks confirm that 
interdependency models should include more information. They recommend 
considering structure, flow characteristics 106, system operation 109,117, and temporal 
aspects 97. This additional information would facilitate anticipating where, how, and 
under what operational circumstances the interdependencies could manifest given their 
spatial and operational context, and therefore how widespread resulting outages could be.  
In addition to improving communication across utilities, literature suggests 
developing coordination between infrastructure managers, arguing that it could lead to 
more effective vulnerability mitigation. Derrible argues that “A more coordinated and 
better planned integration is highly desirable” because integrated systems can consider 
more of society’s needs (health, equity, overall efficiency) (Derrible, 2017). Chester & 
Allenby (2018) citing Larence and Lorsch (1967) argue “Organic [organizational] 
structures allow for more internal specialization to respond to changing environments, 
thereby increasing responsiveness”118 because “distributing the knowledge and decision-
making at the bottom of the hierarchy becomes more effective when  the environment [in 
which infrastructure operate] becomes unstable and high-level management cannot 
acquire all of the knowledge associated with the changing environment (Sherehiy et al., 
2007)”.119,120 This generates the question for utilities, do coordinated institutional 
strategies between utilities have the potential to reduce vulnerability better than other 
institutional strategies? Models which identify the pathways of failure propagation can 
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serve as a baseline to explore different institutional strategy inputs to see how well they 
can mitigate failures.   
 
1.6 Dissertation Objectives 
The objective of the dissertation is to develop impact assessment models that improve 
water utilities’ capacity to prepare for increased heat exposure and interdependencies by: 
(1) Anticipating the water distribution infrastructure component and system-level 
responses from exposure to heat and exploring adaptation strategies related to 
reducing component probability of failure.  
(2) Anticipating the impact of stochastic hardware failure on the service losses in 
a water network over time and exploring adaptation strategies related to 
reducing water outages.  
(3) Presenting a modeling framework capable of anticipating pathways of failure 
propagation across coupled infrastructure systems and providing a tool to 
explore the benefits of coordination between water and power utilities.  
The studies in the bolded box in Figure 1 highlights how the work of this dissertation 
would contribute to improving the types of information used in climate change 
assessments related to increasing heat for water distribution systems.  
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1.7 Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 2: Water Distribution System Failure Risks with Increasing Temperatures 
Research Questions 
What is the projected increase in risk of component failures 
and service losses within water distribution systems with 
increases in maximum summertime temperatures? Where 
should municipal water utility management strategies be 
focused to mitigate increases in risk? 
Approach 
i) potential temperature-induced sensitivities were identified 
for physical components and aspects of water quality; ii) 
quantitative relationships between failure and temperature 
exposure were identified; iii) ranges and distributions of major 
operating conditions impacting degradation were identified; iv) 
average maximum daily summertime temperature projection 
data were processed for Phoenix, Arizona and Las Vegas, 
Nevada; vi) Monte Carlo simulations were used to perform 
calculations of failure metrics for each temperature scenario 
given operating conditions; vi) probability distribution 
functions were fitted to Monte Carlo outputs; vii) projections 
of failure using failure rates for physical components and 
probabilities of water quality non- compliance were calculated 
from probability distribution functions; and, ix) fault trees were 
created to estimate how individual component failures and 
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quality non-compliances could propagate to service outages 
given different operational scenarios. 
Deliverable 
Peer-reviewed journal article published in Engineering Science 
& Technology 2018. 
Intellectual Merit 
The probability of component failure is quantitatively 
estimated under future temperature scenarios and is compared 
across components. Probabilities are used to estimate the 
possible increase in service outages.  
 
Chapter 3: Anticipating Water Distribution Losses from Climate Change 
Research Questions 
What are the cumulative impacts of heat on water components? 
What are the impacts of increased component failures on 
service losses? What are some effective strategies for reducing 
the additional outages from climate change? 
Approach 
The Perses model is designed to simulate the reliability of 
water distributions systems into the future under long-term 
exposure to different possible temperature projections. 
Multiple temperature scenarios are considered including a 
baseline (where historical temperatures persist, i.e., no climate 
change) and futures with changing temperatures based on the 
Global Circulation Model (GCM) ensembles. A Python 
wrapper is used to stochastically fail components in each time 
step based on their temperature exposure and their individual 
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robustness, and then implement the failed state of components 
in EPANET to track the consequential service outages, 
considering daily demand patterns and hydraulic flows. The 
program tracks the time of failed components and repairs 
according to given repair times. The results show a comparison 
of the increases in pipe and pump failures and how water 
outages increase under different temperature change scenarios. 
Two case studies are used to evaluate the effects of 
temperature on component failures and network service 
outages under extreme heat scenarios similar to those in the 
U.S. Southwest. The model is then used to explore adaptation 
strategies relating to probability of failure and repair times. 
Deliverable Peer-reviewed journal article.  
Intellectual Merit 
The Perses model shows the capability of a dynamic extended 
period simulation to aid decision making about climate 
adaptation by estimating the impacts to consumers. The use of 
Perses for projecting failures from increasing temperatures in 
water distribution systems shows that utilities in the 
Southwestern region of the U.S. that experience high 
temperatures will likely experience increases in component and 
consequential service level outages to consumers. We hope 
that the insight generated will help mitigate services losses into 
the future.  
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Chapter 4: Understanding and Managing Interdependent Power and Water Systems 
Research Questions 
How can utilities model propagation of failure from 
interdependencies and anticipate vulnerability? How can they 
use these models to explore effects of institutional strategies? 
Approach 
Since sufficient modeling frameworks are not yet available, we 
present a modeling framework which uses real-time simulation 
of coupled network models and a case study of a specific 
coupled network. This modeling framework could then be used 
to answer the questions posed in the introduction for other 
coupled networks to answer the questions: Where are the 
locations in the network that are vulnerable to propagation of 
failure from interdependencies? How much vulnerability do 
interdependencies cause? Do coordinated institutional 
strategies between utilities have the potential to reduce 
vulnerability better than other institutional strategies? 
Deliverable Peer-reviewed journal article. 
Intellectual Merit 
This case study shows how failures can propagate across 
infrastructure systems in real time, which improves the 
knowledge we have about how interdependencies can cause 
additional vulnerability for utilities. Instead of only considering 
the resource flows between networks or the number of 
connection points, adding information about whether 
interdependencies cause failures given the resource flows 
within the network configurations, the operational settings of 
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the components, and the operational management strategies, 
allows for anticipation of outages due to interdependencies. 
Anticipating outages from example propagations of failure in 
turn allows for the evaluation of outcomes from different 
institutional strategies both within and across systems. The 
result of the evaluation of strategies of this case study shows 
that there is potential for infrastructure systems managers to 
minimize impacts of interdependencies across systems by 
coordinating with other utilizes. We hope utilities use this 
finding as further motivation to consider coordination 
strategies across utilities.  
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CHAPTER 2 
WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FAILURE RISKS WTH INCREASING 
TEMPERATURES 
2.1 Introduction  
Civil infrastructure systems are vital for delivering resources, providing protection, 
and facilitating most urban activities. Typically, these systems are designed to last for 
long periods of time, often on the order of decades, and some systems persist for over a 
century.2 Today, infrastructure operational limits are designed based on historical climate 
conditions,2 and global climate models project that these conditions will likely be more 
frequently exceeded in the future.2 Consequently, the predictions of infrastructure 
reliability from historical climate data may over-predict the lifespans and reliability under 
future conditions. One particular climate change-related hazard is global temperature rise, 
and in regions that already have hot climates, further increases in temperature may pose 
serious risks for people and the infrastructure upon which they rely.121 In the US, of 
particular concern is the Southwest region, where limited water supplies coupled with 
further increases in temperature may pose major challenges. For example, the National 
Climate Association reports that the Southwestern US “regional annual average 
temperatures are projected to rise by 1.4-3.0oC by mid-century and by 3.0-5.3oC by end-
of-century with continued growth in global emissions (A2 emissions scenario), and with 
the greatest increases being in the summer and fall”.122 If urban densification occurs, it 
has the potential to cause even greater temperature increases via urban heat island.123 In 
hot climates, it is reported that infrastructure components occasionally fail from high 
summertime temperatures because of overheating and increasing rates of undesirable 
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chemical reactions.6,124 These failures can lead to service outages when there is not 
enough redundancy or emergency response.125 Thus, increased temperatures have the 
potential to increase the probability of outages if design, operation, and management 
practices remain the same. An infrastructure of particular concern is that of potable water 
distribution, where heat may result in failures that lead to disruptions of quantity and 
quality.125 
Water distribution systems are particularly critical to the economic health of cities 
and regions, especially in hot conditions. The delivery of safe and sufficient water to 
residents and commercial establishments is vital to almost all residential, commercial, 
industrial, and public operations, and the overall reliability is dependent upon both the 
availability of the resource, the reliability of the infrastructure, and the quality of the 
water. It is especially important that water systems remain reliable as temperatures rise 
because in addition to greater consumption by individuals,25 the viability of many 
services may also require increased consumption. The electricity generation and 
agricultural industries in particular may need increasing amounts of water in a hotter 
future.78–80 For individuals, heat exposure can also cause a variety of health issues that 
would be significantly exacerbated without access to clean water.81 Additionally, research 
has shown that from increased evaporation and decreased snowmelt, the amount of fresh 
water available to some regions will diminish with increasing global temperatures.122 
When the availability, infrastructural reliability, and quality are all stressed by rising 
temperatures, there could be a significantly greater threat of provisional inadequacies and 
consequential human health and economic losses.  
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The reliability of water systems is already challenging to maintain under current 
temperature conditions. Utilities do not always implement asset management programs to 
track the failure rates of their components and strategically plan for preventative 
maintenance to decrease service outages.126 Instead, components are typically operated to 
failure and utilities rely on their ability to quickly respond and repair, as preventative 
maintenance budgets are usually constrained.7,127 There remains a question as to whether 
this strategy will continue to work under future conditions. Some utilities have identified 
potential threats of increased temperatures, but very few have formally included climate 
change in their design process.6 The American Society of Civil Engineers notes that even 
when scenarios of climate change are explored, there will be “a tradeoff between the cost 
of increasing the system reliability and the potential cost and consequences of potential 
failure”.2 Utilities therefore need information to help them prioritize decisions in 
planning, design, maintenance, and operations.  
Given the potential for increasing temperatures, utilities will need to know how their 
systems may be affected and where efforts should be most focused to prevent and prepare 
for changes in their system.  More specifically, they will need to know how to prepare to 
mitigate failures ahead of time and how to prepare for the effects of failures.128 This study 
strives to answer two questions in the context of seasonally hot cities where temperature 
increases risk of failure: (1) What is the projected increase in risk of potable water service 
loss with increases in maximum summertime temperatures? and (2) Where should 
municipal water utility management strategies be focused to mitigate increases in risk? 
To address these questions, the functionality of water system components and water 
quality are analyzed under temperature conditions characteristic of Phoenix, Arizona and 
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Las Vegas, Nevada, considering climate change. An exploration of the temperature-
related sensitivities and consequential risk is valuable for understanding issues that may 
affect other cities in the future.  
2.2 Methodology  
To aid water utilities in understanding where their systems will be more 
vulnerable and how they can strategically mitigate temperature-related service 
interruptions, the following approach was used: i) potential temperature-induced 
sensitivities were identified for physical components and aspects of water quality; ii) 
quantitative relationships between failure and temperature exposure were identified; iii) 
ranges and distributions of major operating conditions impacting degradation were 
identified; iv) average maximum daily summertime temperature projection data were 
processed for Phoenix, Arizona and Las Vegas, Nevada; vi) Monte Carlo simulations 
were used to perform calculations of failure metrics for each temperature scenario given 
operating conditions; vi) probability distribution functions were fitted to Monte Carlo 
outputs; vii) projections of failure using failure rates for physical components and 
probabilities of water quality non- compliance were calculated from probability 
distribution functions; and, ix) fault trees were created to estimate how individual 
component failures and quality non-compliances could propagate to service outages 
given different operational scenarios. The resulting component projections of failure, 
percent increases in failure, and expected number of service outages under scenarios of 
the possible temperature exposure in the next 30 years considering best and worst case 
operating conditions are used to make recommendations for focused management 
strategies. A process flow diagram of the methodology is shown in SI Figure S1.  
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2.2.1 Quantifying Temperature-Related Exposure and Degradation 
The physical components and aspects of water quality that have been shown to be 
sensitive to temperature were first identified through literature review to assess how 
operational failures might increase. Temperature sensitivities affect component wear and 
the rate of chemical reactions, the latter leading to the potential for increased pipe 
degradation and corrosion or quality non-compliance. Temperature-sensitivities are found 
in the motors10–12,82 and electronics83,84 used in pumping units, thermoplastic16 and metal 
pipes17, and in the chemical processes in the water from decay of the disinfectant 
residual32 and increase in disinfection byproduct production (DBP)33,34 (SI Table S1). 
While high temperature is known to affect water demand25, soil expansion129, material 
stress in pipes from temperature change130,131, the health of system operators132, 
nitrification rates39–41,133, and the growth of harmful bacteria like Mycobacterium Avium 
Complex37,38 and Legionella,35,36 these effects were excluded from analysis because of 
lack of basic data and quantitative relationships.  
There is ample evidence that summer temperatures contribute to degradation of 
water system components and quality. From experience of operation, the  Las Vegas 
Valley Water District has found that their cooling systems for pumping units may be 
inadequate for higher summer temperatures and that thermoplastic pipes fail more 
frequently in the desert heat.6,134 Observational studies of rates of corrosion and DBP 
production over year-long periods show that rates are higher during summer when the 
water is warmer.17,33,34,135 Additionally, an experimental study of chlorine residual decay 
in water samples also shows that reaction rates increase when samples are subjected to 
warmer water temperatures under periods of about a day.32 
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Studies of environmental and public health hazards have found that the impact of 
a hazard depends on “the concentration, amount or intensity of a particular agent that 
reaches a target system in terms of its duration, frequency, and intensity”.136 It is 
therefore assumed that physical components and aspects of water quality would have 
varying levels of degradation as a function of their durations and magnitudes of exposure. 
While the empirical studies of water quality aspects and corrosion rates show that a 
summertime period or shorter is enough to cause the reported change in reaction rates, 
the exact duration of exposure that it takes for temperatures above rated thresholds to 
cause degradation to the physical components (i.e. PVC pipes, motors, and electronics) at 
the reported rates is unknown. We speculate that because degradation is cumulative for 
physical components, cumulative exposure duration might be important. No empirical 
data or models were identified to establish a useable relationship between cumulative 
exposure and degradation rate for these components, so we propose a theoretical 
relationship that is derived in Appendix A.2. However, we are not able to employ this 
cumulative temperature model in the current paper owing to a lack of empirical data on 
the effects of cumulative exposure. Fortunately, there is some information available on 
the relationship between maximum temperature exposure and component degradation 
rate. One source states that reported motor degradation rates apply “even if the 
overheating was only temporary”.12 We therefore interpret published degradation rates 
for PVC pipes, motors, and electronics as being appropriate to characterize degradation 
from brief but repeated exposure of water systems to peak temperatures over the 
components’ service lives. When water systems are deployed in the field, they are 
exposed to exactly this type of pattern of “temporary”, but repeated, maximum 
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temperatures; this exposure happens almost every summer afternoon. The hottest 
afternoons in U.S. cities tend to occur in June, July, and August, which is when 
temperatures sometimes exceed safe operating temperature ratings of components.  
Since both physical components and aspects of water quality are affected by high 
summertime temperatures, this study models failure due to predicted averages of 
maximum daily summertime temperatures between June and August, during the hottest 
three hours of each summer day. This model has a cumulative-peak-exposure 
interpretation because a component in our model is exposed to this peak temperature for 
roughly 270 hours at least once and at most every year (the average temperature of the 
hottest 3 hours each day137 for 3 months, referred to as “3x3” in this paper). If it is the 
case, however, that degradation rates of physical components increase every time the 
component experiences much smaller durations of exposure (e.g. during a minute, hour, 
or week), then the model underestimates projections of failure. If it is the case that the 
degradation occurs only given years of continuous exposure that are longer in duration 
than the 3x3 window time frame, the model overestimates failures. With empirical daily 
or monthly failure data, future studies could determine the specific duration of exposure 
needed to cause these rates of degradation to physical components. 
 
2.2.2 Urban Water System Case Study  
Given their large populations, hot environments, and modern infrastructure, a 
potable water system with characteristic conditions of the cities of Phoenix, Arizona and 
Las Vegas, Nevada was modeled as a case study. These metro areas are two of the largest 
and fastest growing regions in the Southwestern US, and experience some of the highest 
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temperatures of metro area across the US.138,139,47 They both have populations of around 5 
million people and experience 35 – 40oC average daily summer temperatures.138,139 The 
largest water utilities in each metro region service around 1.5 million customers 
each.140,141 Since studies on temperature affects to operation are sparse, the failure metric 
equations and ranges of operational characteristics from literature were used from 
systems around the world that do not necessarily represent the Las Vegas and Phoenix 
case studies. Therefore, the temperature data and number of components are the aspects 
of the system that are characterized by the case studies.  A comparison of the relevant 
water utility characteristics is shown in SI Table S2.  
Climate projections show significant increases in temperature in Phoenix and Las 
Vegas into the future. Phoenix and Las Vegas projections of the averages of maximum 
daily summer temperatures (3x3) are shown in SI Figure S3. Temperature projections 
were processed from CMIP5 12x12 km gridded data from Global Climate Model (GCM) 
projections of representative concentration pathway (RCP) scenarios 2.6, 6, 4.5, and 
8.5.121 The 3x3 maximum air temperature in Phoenix is projected to increase to at least 
40°C in 2020 and at most 44°C in 2050 (including the GCM’s standard deviation of 
temperature). In Las Vegas it is projected to increase to at least 36°C in 2020 and at most 
41°C in 2050. The temperature range used to force the failure model considers the total 
range of both cities with GCM uncertainty, i.e., 36 – 44oC at 1oC intervals.  
 
2.2.3 Modeling Increases in Component and Water Quality Failure 
Failure can be measured as events where reliability requirements are not met.7 
Motors and electronics within pumping units failing to operate, pipes breaking and not 
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delivering water at required pressures, chlorine residual concentrations below regulation, 
and DBP concentrations above regulation each constitute failures. Estimated-time-to-
failure (ETTF), which represents the lifetime of components in units of years, and 
chemical concentration therefore represent “failure metrics” that indicate the potential for 
failure of components and the aspects of water quality, respectively. With temperature 
sensitivities identified, a review was conducted to identify the quantitative relationships 
between temperature and component failure and chemical reaction rates to characterize 
failure metrics. The ETTF parameter was calculated when the quantitative relationship 
between exposure temperature and lifespan of component was given and was used to 
estimate effects of overheating on motors and electronics, degradation of polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) pipes, and corrosion of iron pipes. Chemical concentration represents the 
failure metric of chlorine residual decay and the production of DBPs. 
An increase in ambient temperature threatens overheating of motors and 
electronics that are vital to the operation of the pumping units. Motors can overheat from 
the combined dissipated heat from motor windings and the ambient temperature 
surrounding the motor, causing destruction of the insulation which can lead to burnt 
stator windings.10–12,82 It is reported as a rule of thumb in the industry that for every 10°C 
increase in the operating temperature over the capacity of the insulation--155°C for class 
F motors -- the lifespan decreases by one-half (Appendix A.4.1.1).10–12,82 Conversely, the 
lifespan increases by one-half for every 10°C decrease in the operating temperature 
below the capacity of the insulation. 11 The electronic controls that are used for pump 
operation are also sensitive to the combination of dissipated heat and the outside 
temperature within their enclosures, and for every 10°C rise in enclosure temperature 
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above 40oC, the lifespan of the electronics decreases by one-half (Appendix A.4.1.1).83,84 
It was assumed that electronics have the same property as motors when temperatures are 
below their capacity. With these relationships, we estimate the ETTFs that result from 
exposure to average peak summertime temperature scenarios.  
Water temperatures in the distribution system rise in response to increases in 
ambient temperatures. The relationship between water and air temperatures was modeled 
using the empirically derived linear regression equations from a study of temperatures at 
water treatment plant outlets in Japan.142 Coefficients of the regression range from 0.52 – 
0.89 oC in water / oC in air and the constants range from 1.88 – 7.89 oC in water. Despite 
some novel research on the topic, 142,143 predicting water temperature within distribution 
pipes is challenging due to a lack of empirical data. With high water temperatures, 
thermoplastic pipes can experience overbearing pressures, with the greatest effects on 
PVC.16 The derating of the PVC pipe is linear with increasing water temperatures 
(Appendix A.4.1.3). Iron pipes are sensitive to indirect effects of water temperature 
through internal corrosion.17 The relationship between corrosion rate and water 
temperature over a year-long period has been reported in the literature for the cast iron 
pipe material, so this is the type of iron pipe modeled. Temperature may have a similar 
effect on the corrosion rate of ductile iron and steel pipes, though no relationship was 
found in literature. Corrosion rates for cast iron pipes are reported to be empirically 
different for water distribution systems (WDS) and  water treatment plants (WTP) 
(Appendix A.4.1.4). 17 Corrosion rates and pipe age were used to calculate pit depth and 
then to the calculate the ETTF from the remaining life of the pipe according to Randall-
Smith et al.144  
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Water quality is also affected by an increase in water temperature. Summertime 
temperatures increase the reaction rates between the organics and disinfectants in water, 
thereby increasing the formation of the cancerous DBP, total trihalomethane (TTHM), 
according to an empirical study on seasonal drinking water quality in Istanbul City, 
Turkey, where water is supplied through surface water and is treated through “aeration, 
prechlorination, coagulation, flocculation-sedimentation, filtration, and postchlorination” 
(Appendix A.4.1.5).33 The concentration of another DBP, total haloacetic acid (THAA), 
is directly dependent upon the concentration of TTHMs and seasonal temperatures as 
well, according to an empirical study of three drinking water systems in the United 
Kingdom which represent a range of source water conditions – “upland surface water, a 
lowland surface water, and groundwater” with standard treatment mechanisms: aeration, 
filtration, coagulation, sedimentation, and chlorination (Appendix A.4.1.6)34.  
The other type of temperature-related quality concern is that of chlorine residual 
decay as water travels to the consumer. The final chlorine concentration was calculated 
based on the initial concentration of chlorine from dosage at a water treatment plant, the 
minimum allowable concentration of chlorine, and the chlorine decay constant (Appendix 
A.4.1.7). The decay constant’s relationship with temperature experienced over day-long 
periods was taken from an experimental study with samples from two water distribution 
systems in Birmingham, Alabama, by Hua et al.32 Table 1 shows the equations used to 
calculate the failure metrics for each component and aspect of water quality, though a 
more detailed discussion can be found in the Appendix A.4. All equations characterize 
temperature in terms of degrees Celsius because experiments and rules of thumb from the 
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literature measured temperature in Celsius. Equations would need to be modified to allow 
for the use of another unit of temperature.  
 
Table 1 Failure Metric Equations. More detailed equations are shown in Appendix A.4. 
T= temperature rise above component threshold [oC] , Tw = water temperature [oC], ETTF 
(T/Tw) = estimated-time-to-failure after air or water exposure [years], C(Tw) = chemical 
concentration after water temperature exposure, MTTFT1 = historical mean-time-to-
failure [years], rd = lifespan degradation fraction per 10oC above capacity [no units], t = 
age of pipe [years], tw = water age, Pi = internal pit depth [cm], ∂ = pipe wall thickness 
[cm], C0 = initial chlorine concentration [mg/L], TOC = total organic carbon [mg/L], Cl2 
= chlorine dosage [mg/L], SUVA = specific UV absorbance [l/mg*m], Br = bromide 
[mg/L], ResT = water age [h], Season = season of year, numerically expressed as: 1 for 
spring, 1.46 for summer, 1.31 for autumn, and 1.01 for winter. 
 
Component/Aspect of 
Water Quality 
Failure Metrics 
ETTF (T or Tw) = C(Tw) = Source  
Motors and 
Electronics 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹$% ∗ (1 − 𝑟+)$/%.  
10–12,82–
84 
PVC Pipes 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹$% ∗ (−0.0123𝑇3 + 1.293) 16 
Iron Pipes 𝑡0.5𝑡(0.0774 ∗ 𝑇3 − 0.1073) + 𝑃; 𝛿 17,144 
Chlorine Residual 
Concentration  𝐶.𝑒?....@.AB.BCDEFGHI JG 32 
TTHM Concentration                                                   
11.967(TOC)0.398*Tw 0.158*Cl20.702 33 
THAA Concentration                               
0.99(TTHM)0.64*(Cl2)0.15*SUVA0.09*(Br-  +0.005)-
0.12*(ResT+5)0.07*Season 34 
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While temperature contributes to failure, the effects of operating characteristics can 
also be significant. Table 7 shows the characteristics used to calculate the failure metrics. 
Examples include the range in water temperature vs. air temperature regression 
coefficients, MTTFT1 and heat dissipation of motors and electronics, and the age of water 
in pipelines. Estimates of the possible ranges and likely distributions of these 
characteristics were identified through literature review and were modeled as uniform or 
lognormal distributions to account for their uncertainty. Uniform distributions were used 
when there was no information available about the relative likelihood of certain values 
over others within the reported range. Lognormal distributions were used when there was 
evidence for a skewed distribution present in real water distribution systems.  
Monte Carlo simulations were then performed to calculate and characterize 
probability distributions of the failure metrics. When performing the calculation of failure 
metrics for each temperature, the distributions of operational characteristics were 
sampled 5,000 times. To estimate the variation in failure metrics under different regimes 
of operating characteristics, the ranges of operational characteristics were divided into 
lower and upper halves (representing best-a worst- case operating conditions) and Monte 
Carlo simulations were run over both halves separately. The terms best- and worst- cases 
within the reported literature are not determined to be optimal and sub-optimal 
respectively from independent sources.  Distributions of “failure metrics” were created 
for each average maximum summertime temperature and operational scenario by 
performing Monte Carlo simulations for each 1oC increase in the range 36-44oC, 
resulting in similar histogram outputs that are just shifted to higher values of failure 
metrics with increasing temperature. The output failure metric values from the 
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simulations were fit into probability distribution functions using Anderson Darling 
Statistics, probability plots, visualization and judgement about distributions that best fit 
the process underlying the data. 145 Weibull distributions were fitted to the physical 
components in pumping units and pipes because the form most accurately represents 
degradation with age and it also produced reasonable fits, as shown in figures S4-S11 .146 
These distributions characterize the histograms of component failures from a population 
of components overtime, and time represents ages of the components – starting at zero.146 
Motors and PVC pipes were the only components that had outputs that were statistically 
equal to the Weibull at the 10% significance level. The output distributions for chlorine 
residual concentration were fitted as exponential distributions based on best fit and the 
need to be consistent across operating scenarios. The output distributions for DBP 
concentration were fitted as Gamma distributions based on best fit. Output data and their 
fit distributions and probability plots are shown in figures S4-S20. Parameters of the 
distributions and Anderson-Darling Statistics are shown in Tables 9 and 10.  
The projection of each component failure and type of water non-compliance was 
calculated through either hazard functions or integration of the distributions characterized 
by the failure metrics. The ETTF distributions of physical components were used to 
calculate components’ annual failure rates with the hazard function of the Weibull 
distribution (units: % failed/year), which characterizes their failure behavior starting in 
the next instant of their lives, given that they had already lived a certain number of years. 
147 The time period of the rate was then converted to be during the next summertime 
period of its life instead of a full year --as characterized by a period of 270 hours out of 
the total 8760 hours in a year (Appendix A.4.3.1).147 It is necessary to calculate failure 
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rate after the components have operated up until a non-zero age because there would be 
very little likelihood of their failure given any temperature exposure if they were brand 
new. The DBP formation distributions were used to calculate the probability that a 
concentration from the distribution would be above the EPA regulated threshold of 80 
µg/L and 60 µg/L for THMs and THAAs respectively148 for each sampling station in the 
network for any point in time that the water temperature scenario is experienced, as 
shown in Appendix A.4.3.2. Similarly, the chlorine residual distributions were used to 
calculate the probability that a concentration from a sampling station would be 
undetectable and therefore non-compliant with EPA regulation for any point in time that 
the water temperature scenario is experienced.149 A figure of the overall failure metric 
distribution formation and probability calculation methodology is shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2 Methods of Projection of Component-level Failure Calculations. For 
physical components, the ETTF distribution is shifted to the left, which effectively shifts 
to the left through Monte Carlo analysis under increasing temperature scenarios. For 
disinfection byproducts, the failure metric, chemical concentration (C) is shifted to the 
right, and for chlorine residual is shifted to the left. Shaded regions represent integrated 
areas under the curves that are used to calculate failure rate and probability of failure.  
2.2.4 Modeling Failure Cascades to Service Outages 
Component probabilities of failure and failure rates were propagated to 
probabilities of systemic failure using a reliability engineering fault tree analysis to assess 
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the impact of component hierarchies, points of redundancy, and presence of back-up 
systems on the likelihood of systemic failure.147 Water distribution systemic failure is 
defined as the pressure, flow, or quality falling below specified values at one or more 
nodes in the network. The three temperature induced pathways to service outages are 
pumping station outages, pipe breaks, and water quality non-compliance, and are shown 
as individual fault trees in Figure 3. Pipe breaks and pumping station outages can both 
directly cause failures in the water distribution system (WDS) and indirectly cause 
failures in the WDS due to failures of water treatment plants (WTP). The fault trees 
highlight which component failures lead to service outages. To calculate systemic 
probabilities of failure, physical components were assumed to have series behavior 
(meaning that if any one component fails, the sub-system fails), and failure rates were 
propagated from a component level to a system level according to the system reliability 
equations that state that individual component or sub-system failure rates are summed in 
a series system (Appendix A.5).147 The use of the hazard function to calculate component 
failure rate allows for the characterization of failure behavior of all components during 
the same instant in time (when they are all at the certain ages in the scenario). To 
calculate the probability of water quality non-compliance, the probability of either a non-
compliance from TTHM or chlorine residual decay occurring was found through the 
union of their probabilities (Appendix A.5).147 Expected occurrences of service outages 
were calculated from these propagated failure rates and probabilities, along with the 
estimates of the number of components. Scenarios of numbers of available redundancies 
of components were explored in the calculation of pumping unit failure rate leading to 
pumping station failure rate, water treatment or water distribution failure rate, and 
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ultimately to distribution system failure rate (Tables 5 & 6). These values are relative to 
the average number of pipes, pumping stations, and quality sampling sites in Phoenix and 
Las Vegas (Table 6). An important type of redundancy is stored water in tanks 
throughout the network that can offset the pressure and flow lost during a pipe and pump 
station break and provide a location for re-dosing the distribution system with chlorine 
disinfectant. Without estimating water volumes at different times, water distribution tank 
storage was assumed to be 100% likely to be inadequate for stopping a pumping station 
outage or pipe break from causing some magnitude of water outage. A more specific 
representation of the availability of water storage would require knowing temporal and 
spatial information of the system structure and operations over time.  
 
Figure 3 Fault Tree Diagrams showing three trees of systemic failure leading to a 
possible water service outage: 1) pump station outage, 2) pipe break, and 3) water quality 
non-compliance. The boxes represent failure events and their different colors represent 
hierarchies of failure (i.e. sub-component, component, intermediate systemic, ultimate 
systemic). It was assumed that if one out of two pumping units, pumping stations, and 
 35 
water treatment plants failed, demand would not adequately be met and failure would 
propagate as detailed in SI Table S4. 
It is possible that these individual pathways to outages could also happen 
simultaneously—leading to potentially longer and more severe supply and quality 
outages. For example, low pressures in the system from pipe breaks or pumping station 
outages not only independently cause quantity supply outages and seepage of 
contamination, but when coupled with pre-existing quality issues, pose a human health 
threat.150 If both physical components and quality fail in the same time frame, the 
customers could experience longer periods of low pressures and durations of 
contamination because of the potential difficulty of rerouting and flushing water.7,150  The 
probabilities of simultaneous occurrences of different types of water outages were thus 
also calculated, using standard probability law of simultaneous events for the expected 
values of service losses from physical component failure rates and water quality non-
compliance probabilities (Appendix A.5). Simultaneous probability was estimated 
through viewing the conditional probability portion of the physical component failure 
rate as stand-alone under the certain time interval of 270 hours.  
2.3 Results  
2.3.1 Projected Increase in Component Risk  
Over the full range of possible temperatures in all RCPs and including GCM 
uncertainty, the increase in component probability of failure from 2020 to 2050 ranges 
from 10-101% for the Phoenix and Las Vegas-characteristic utility. The average 
probabilities of failure and failure rates (between best- and worst- operating conditions) 
are the highest for chlorine residual and pumping stations, pumping units, motors and 
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electronics (within pumping units). This holds across all temperatures, as shown in Figure 
4. Detailed results are shown in SI Table S10.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Average Component and Water Quality Projection of Failure: Component 
failure rates and probabilities of failure are shown as a function of temperature. 
Temperature ranges for Phoenix and Las Vegas are plotted on the abscissa. Chlorine 
residual, and pumping units are the components with the highest probability of failure. 
Pumping stations, inadequate chlorine residual, and motors are projected to have the 
greatest percent increases in failure. 
The components that pose the greatest threat to reliability are those that have both 
the highest probability or rate of failure and the greatest percent increase in these values 
between the 2020 and 2050 scenarios. Thus, the most concerning aspect is water quality 
non-compliances due to the decay of chlorine residual and TTHM production.  Chlorine 
residual decay will have the largest probability of failure and will also have a large 
percent increase with increasing temperatures. The relationship between inadequate 
chlorine residual and temperature is exponential, and therefore the percent increase in 
failure rates between 2020 and 2050 will be 53% ± 36% on average depending on 
operating conditions. There is no validation available for the historical frequency of non-
compliances, though there is evidence that non-compliances have been non-zero. Annual 
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water quality reports show that out of the last 5 years in the City of Phoenix, there were 4 
years where concentrations fell below the minimum residual concentration at least once 
sometime during the year.151–155 TTHM production has the second highest probability of 
failure but has a lower percent increase of 17% ± 10% on average. It is unlikely however 
that the non-compliance thresholds of the other form of DBP, THAA, will be exceeded 
under this scenario of operational practices. This is because the calculated concentrations 
of THAA at different temperatures were only around 25% of the regulated levels. Though 
the chance of occurrence is high, it should be noted that there are no reports of DBP 
violations in the past in either city in recent years.140,156    
The failure processes of second-most concern are those of electronics, motors, 
pumping units and pumping stations. Pumping station failure rates are projected to have a 
percent increase of 76% ± 15%, depending on operating conditions. The historical 
average failure rate of motors across a variety of industries in the US is on average 3-12% 
every year under current temperature conditions.10 Extending the 270-hr failure rates to 
yearly values provides a value to check validity with historical data. The estimates of 
annual failure rates under all temperature scenarios from 36oC (8.6% ± 5.6%) to 44oC 
(26% ± 16%) fall within this historical range.  
Pipe failures show a less significant increase in threat to utility reliability in the 
future compared to other component failures. Between the two types of degradation, 
corrosion causes a greater increase in probability of failure than does the degradation of 
thermoplastic pipes, though probability of failure of PVC pipes from degradation will be 
consistently greater than probability of failure of iron pipes from corrosion. The corrosion 
process associated with iron pipes causes the probability of failure to have a percent 
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increase of 52% ± 12% in the average WDS, and of 76% ± 8% in the average WTP. The 
PVC pipe failure rate has a percent increase of 10% ± 0.2% in the average WDS. The 
historical failure rates of polyethylene pipes, pipes with similar degradation rates to PVC 
pipes, in Las Vegas in 2005 was 2.2% (679 breaks out of 25,000 PE pipes) in the summer 
and 6.5% over the year (1623 breaks out of 25,000 PE pipes).6,134,157 The PVC pipe 
failure rate estimate from the model given the average peak summer temperature of 2005 
(44oC)158 in Las Vegas is 0.2% ± 0.13% in the summer and 6.5% ± 4.3% over the year, 
so is consistent with historical data. Current annual iron pipe break rates are reported to 
be 6% on average in the United States.141 For WTP iron pipes, the estimates of annual 
failure rates under all temperature scenarios from 36oC (0.32% ± 0.32%) to 44oC (0.84% 
± 0.84%) fall below this historical range. Additionally, WDS iron pipe failure rates are 
negligible under all temperatures (0.005% ± 0.005% per year at 44 oC).  Underestimates 
in modeled versus observed failure rates are in part due to the fact that there are multiple 
modes of pipe breaks in reality - longitudinal, circumferential, corrosion through hole, 
split bell/bell shear, and joint failure129 - that are not accounted for in the model. In the 
results, the lifetime of the pipe is only modeled from an increase in corrosion and 
degradation. While the Weibull distribution can predict other forms of aging, it cannot 
account for the random breaks due to factors like inadequate bedding support and live 
loads caused by traffic that are independent of climate effects.129 Moreover, results of 
pipe failure rates show that utilities should expect the high rate of PVC pipes to slightly 
increase, but should also anticipate an increase in WTP iron pipe breaks with increases in 
temperature.  
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2.3.2 Projected Increase in Service Outages 
The probability of service outages increases as a result of propagated component 
failures. Individual water outages and water quality non-compliances are projected to 
have a percent increase within the 7-91% range and simultaneous water outages and 
water quality non-compliances are projected to have a percent increase within the 23-
123% range, depending on the type of event and how the system is operated. Figure 5 
shows the resulting expected occurrence of water outage and quality failure when all 
combinations of systemic probability are considered.  
 
 
 
Figure 5 Isolated and Simultaneous Service Outages. Dashed lines represent Las 
Vegas temperature ranges from 2020 – 2050 while dotted lines represent temperature 
ranges in Phoenix. Venn diagrams in the first column show which type of systemic 
failure was analyzed. The ranges of failures due to changing operating conditions are 
shown in colored bands to characterize opportunities for risk mitigation. All best-case 
operating conditions together contribute to the lower range of expected number of 
failures and all worst-case conditions together contribute to the upper range of expected 
number of failures. The large range shown from the bands suggests that the expected 
number of failures is sensitive to changes in operating conditions.  
 40 
Results show that the components that have the highest probability of failure and 
failure rates and that increase the most in failures - namely water quality non-
compliances and pumping station outages - directly contribute to the greatest increase in 
service outages. The type of isolated water outage that is projected to increase the most is 
that from pump station failures. The expected number of water outages from pump 
station failures has a percent increase of 76% ± 15%. The second highest percent increase 
in water outages is from quality non-compliances of 17% ± 0.4%, and lastly, water 
outage percent increase from pipe breaks is estimated to be 10% ± 3%. Unfortunately, 
there was no identified available historical data for how many simultaneous outages 
currently occur currently for direct comparison.   
Because the individual modes of water outage that increase the most are also 
more likely to happen simultaneously with other types of service outages, the 
simultaneous service outages that will have the greatest percent increase are those that 
include pump station outages and water quality non-compliances. This means that though 
utilities are used to responding to frequent pipe breaks, the increasing simultaneous 
occurrence of pipe breaks with pumping station outages and/or water quality non-
compliances could cause outages that are increasingly difficult to recover from. 
 
2.4 Priority Maintenance Strategies 
Instances of water quality non-compliance and pumping station failures are also the 
failure modes that have the greatest potential for being prevented, and as such should be 
prioritized for failure prevention. The large sensitivity in failures for all events that are 
caused by water quality non-compliances and pumping station failures (as shown in the 
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colored bands in Figure 5) show that changing the operating conditions for these 
components would be the most effective way to reduce failures. The trends in failure shift 
from linear to exponential between operating conditions. Specifically, the results show 
that there is a maximum 79% absolute reduction in probability of inadequate chlorine 
residual failure when operators inject the higher range of dose of chlorine at the entrance 
point to the WDS, and make sure to maintain a low water age throughout the system. It 
should be noted, however, that injecting the maximum chlorine dosage and allowing for 
more organic carbon causes a 64% absolute increase in probability of non-compliances 
from TTHM production. Therefore, both residual chlorine and DBP concentrations 
should be monitored carefully under any chlorine dosing strategy. Pumping station failure 
rates are also sensitive to operating conditions as there is a maximum 15% absolute 
reduction in the pumping station failure rate when motors and electronics dissipate low 
amounts of heat, and there are cooling devices implemented that reduce operating 
temperatures. The expected value of pipe failures from corrosion and degradation is not 
very sensitive to changes in characteristics like pipe diameter and normal operating 
pressure (1% absolute reduction), and thus could not be easily decreased through 
changing these characteristics.  
2.5 Model Uncertainty 
Uncertainties associated with water temperature in underground pipes, the time it 
takes for degradation to occur, availability of water storage, component failures from 
waterhammer, and projections of future trends in model parameters should all be 
considered when assessing applicability of the risk projections to a specific water utility. 
These characteristics were necessarily inserted into the model as assumptions, but their 
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variability would have an effect on the output probabilities of failure. A 10% change to 
degradation rates results in a percent change of 0-22% of motor and electronic failures 
depending on the temperature and operating conditions scenario. Specific values are 
shown in Appendix A.3. The addition of this variance would make pumping stations 
more comparable to all other components in terms of percent increase in failure. 
Assuming that there is a 50% chance (instead of 100% chance) of an inadequate amount 
of water storage decreases the likelihood of outage from pipe break by 50% and an 
outage from pumping station failure by 50%.  Additionally, if quantitative relationships 
to describe the effect of waterhammer from one component failure causing another 
became available, the frequency of pipe and pumping unit failure might increase.  Lastly, 
it is hard to know what the resulting risk will be when normal structural and operational 
characteristics change over time from urban expansion, transformative designs, etc.   
2.6 Discussion  
The study is a critical first step towards helping utilities prepare for climate change 
and extreme events by identifying and characterizing the aspects of the system and chain 
of failure events most sensitive to heat. The results are modeled to show how discrete 
increases in temperature increase chances of failure. As framed, the results provide a 
directionally reliable estimate telling us that component and service failures will increase 
with increasing temperatures. While estimates of risk contain uncertainty, comparisons 
between the estimated increase in risk for each temperature-sensitive aspect of the system 
are nevertheless valuable for prioritizing where strategies should be focused.  
The results also help identify several critical areas for future research and data 
collection. This model can be most directly applied to warm regions around the world 
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with modern centralized water distribution infrastructure, (e.g. the US Sun Belt, Middle 
East, North Africa, and South Asia), where a large and growing fraction of humanity 
lives and where a large fraction of global 21st century water infrastructure investment will 
occur.159 Even in colder regions the model may be useful, with necessary further work 
because an increase in annual and summer temperature may benefit the system operation 
by helping to prevent pipes from freezing and accelerating the rates of beneficial 
chemical reactions needed for water treatment. 22 Additionally, a network model of 
components and iterative simulations through time would be beneficial to capture 
locations of component failures leading to different resulting magnitudes in outages, and 
the accumulation of degradation overtime by exploring the alternative assumption that 
shorter time periods (rather than the 3x3 duration) cause the reported degradation rates. 
More modeling work, combined with city-specific and component-specific engineering 
data quantifying heat-induced failure rates is necessary to more precisely quantify heat-
induced service failure risk in particular WDSs. An analysis of relative costs of different 
suites of preparative actions and their consequences would also be valuable, but this 
requires data on preventative maintenance, repair, response, lost consumer use, and 
capital improvement costs for each type of failure. Furthermore, the methods of 
projecting risks of future external threats could be expanded to include other threats, 
including flooding and wildfires. It could also be used for the projection of risk in other 
infrastructure systems like transportation and electricity, which also have temperature and 
other climate change event sensitivities.124,160 
  Considering the possibility of other increasingly frequent extreme weather 
events, utilities should recognize that improved response times coupled with the capacity 
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for agile and flexible resources use (including money and equipment) will be critical. The 
water community should also work to phase out vulnerabilities by improving system 
design (e.g. increasing pumping unit insulation capacity, reducing water temperature in 
cooling towers, or adopting “smart” booster chlorination and network sensors6,161), and 
by improving training and institutional response capacity. Ultimately, in times when 
maintenance and response actions are severely constrained by budgets, it is of the utmost 
importance to identify and prioritize strategies by utilizing information on likely 
mechanisms of failure.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ANTICIPATING WATER DISTRIBUTION LOSSES FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 
3.1 Introduction 
With increasing evidence of rapid changes in climate and resulting extreme events, 
infrastructure – the physical systems and managing institutions that deliver critical 
resources and protect us from hazards – must continue to perform reliably. Yet the design 
of infrastructure is often made assuming that past climatic and hydrological conditions 
will persist into the long term, 119 and the rules and codes by which they are designed do 
not change quickly.2 The confluence of a rapidly changing climate and slow changing 
infrastructure, designed assuming stationarity of variability, results in a potential 
crisis.119,162 Without strategic investment, increasing hardware failures and resulting 
service outages can occur without the means to properly respond. Serious questions 
remain as to whether our currently deployed infrastructure can remain functional as 
climate changes and during extreme events, the latter when people may need critical 
services the most. 
In arid and semi-arid regions with hot temperatures, potable water delivery is an 
infrastructure system of particular concern. Water is a critical resource, not just for 
drinking, but often for industries that drive economies (such as manufacturing and 
agriculture), and even for power.25,78–81 This is particularly true in the semiarid Southwest 
US where scarce water resources are transported long distances, populations have and are 
forecasted to grow significantly, agriculture remains a major activity, and thermoelectric 
power generation continues to supply a large fraction of energy.163 If there is a 
continuation of the current path of global emissions, it is projected to lead to around 9-
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10oF increase in average temp in the Southwest by the end of the century relative to the 
late part of the last century (RCP 8.5).164 If total radiative forcing is instead stabilized 
shortly after 2100 without overshooting the long-run radiative forcing target level, there 
is projected to be an average 5-6oF increase (RCP 4.5).164  There has been a great deal of 
work to understand how the accessibility of water resources might change as populations 
and climate change.122 However, there remains a dearth of knowledge of how water 
infrastructure – in particular distribution – might perform under increasing local 
temperatures and what that means for water delivery reliability. It was found in a 
previous study that increasing temperatures affect the reliable operation of hardware 
within water infrastructure, and the failure of one or more pieces of hardware could lead 
to cascading effects.46 Temperature affects component wear that results in the potential 
for overheating of motors 10,12,82,165 and electronics 83,84 used in pumping units. 
Temperature also affects chemical reaction rates that lead to the potential for increased 
pipe degradation and corrosion,16,17 and water quality non-compliance. 32–34  
Modeling impacts to water delivery infrastructure systems from temperature change 
is a promising way to help identify and prioritize adaptation strategies. An important 
reliability metric is the loss of service to consumers. The guidelines for federally required 
water utility reliability and resilience assessments call for an estimation of both the 
duration and severity of service outage that could result from a hazard.5 The severity of 
outages, or the number of consumers who experience outage, depend on mechanisms 
causing hardware component failures, the location of hardware failures within the spatial 
topology of the distribution network, and the timing of flows of water into and within the 
network.7 The duration of outage depends on the repair times of the failed hardware.125 
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While models of either climate impacts to water infrastructure or water reliability have 
included a selection of these processes including climate stress to hardware or demand, 
2,6,44,46,166–168 vulnerability of different types of components,46,68,72,74,169–171 relative 
vulnerability of components of the same type, 63,69,172 historical hardware failure rates, 
46,51,73,74,77,169,170,172–174,54,55,57,63,67,69,71,72 the use of flow-based networks,62,63,174,69,72–
74,76,77,170,172 changing demands, 76 and repair rates, 51,67,68,72,74,77,169,171,172,174 these 
elements are not typically incorporated into one model for anticipating service outages 
from the effects of heat, or any other hazard. The US EPA has developed a software tool 
that can be used to bring much of these pieces of information together, named WNTR, 
but the user must input component failure and repair probability information, and it has 
not yet been designed for simulating the cumulative impacts of long-term exposure.50  
Understanding hardware exposure to changing temperatures and resulting dynamic 
hardware and service losses is central to understanding the challenge of reliable water 
delivery under climate change in semi-arid regions like the Southwest. Yet, there remains 
insufficient coordinated methods or models to fully explore these challenges considering 
ultimate outcomes and the following questions remain unaddressed: (1) What are the 
cumulative impacts of heat on water components? (2) What are the resulting impacts of 
increased component failures on service losses? and (3) What are some effective 
strategies for reducing these additional outages from climate change? To answer these 
questions, we develop a methodology and model to assess water infrastructure 
performance and reliability under changing temperatures. We call this model Perses (after 
the Greek god of destruction), with the hope that the insight generated will help mitigate 
services losses into the future.  
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3.2 Methodology 
Perses is designed to simulate the reliability of water distributions systems into 
the future under long-term exposure to different possible temperature projections. 
Multiple temperature scenarios are considered including a baseline (where historical 
temperatures persist, i.e., no climate change) and futures with changing temperatures 
based on the Global Circulation Model (GCM) ensembles. A Python wrapper is used to 
stochastically fail components in each time step based on their temperature exposure and 
their individual robustness, and then implement the failed state of components in 
EPANET to track the consequential service outages, considering daily demand patterns 
and hydraulic flows. The program tracks the time of failed components and repairs 
according to given repair times. The results show a comparison of the increases in pipe 
and pump failures and how water outages increase under different temperature change 
scenarios. Two case studies are used to evaluate the effects of temperature on component 
failures and network service outages under extreme heat scenarios similar to those in the 
U.S. Southwest. The model is then used to explore adaptation strategies relating to 
probability of failure and repair times. An overview of the process is shown in Appendix 
B.1.  
3.2.1 Developing temperature profile inputs 
A set of six daily temperature profiles are used as alternative inputs to the model 
to anticipate possible futures given three types of uncertainty. There is uncertainty about 
the future emissions profile (i.e. different RCP types), the variables and interactions 
included in the climate models, and the initial conditions within the climate models.175 
Due to the uncertainty in the emissions profile, scenarios of possible daily maximum 
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temperature futures are characterized by a continuation of historical temperatures 
(baseline scenario) 121 and ensembles of daily RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 scenarios from the 
BCCAv2-CMIP5 projection. RCP 4.5 is used as a reasonable minimum bounding case, 
representing a modest instead of aggressive reduction in emissions by the end of the 
century. RCP 8.5 assumes a continuation of the increases in emissions. Due to the 
uncertainty in the variables, interactions, and initial conditions in the climate models of 
dynamics within each scenario, temperature profiles with minimums, averages, and 
maximum temperatures of all runs in all climate models within each RCP type were also 
used.  
The increment of temperature inputs for all profiles is daily; therefore, the same 
temperature is used for each 2-hour timestep within a day in the simulation. Maximum 
daily temperatures are chosen to represent daily temperature for both baseline and future 
projections. Downscaling and projecting hourly temperature variation within a day could 
be used to get a more realistic characterization of the magnitude of exposure values and 
failures. Using maximum daily temperatures produces a consistent overestimation of 
exposure values and failures across scenarios. It is anticipated that the more realistic 
estimation would lead to the same relative changes between baseline and future 
scenarios.  
 
3.2.2 Modeling Component Probability of Failure  
The characterization of the probability of failure of pumps and pipes is used to 
determine whether components have failed in each time step of the simulation. 
Probability distribution functions (PDFs) of failure are generated using the procedure 
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developed in Bondank et al46 by 1) providing variable inputs into temperature-
degradation-failure equations10,11,84,144,12,16,17,32–34,82,83  and 2) running Monte Carlo 
simulations holding each temperature constant.46 Possible future temperature scenarios 
and ranges of operational parameters were used as inputs to these equations. For the 
analysis of the effects of climate change, mid-level ranges of reported operational 
parameters were used. The complete list of ranges of input parameters characterizing 
operating conditions can be found in Bondank et al 2018.46 (Table 7). A separate PDF 
was generated for each daily temperature within the range of daily temperatures from the 
projections (0-57oC). To evaluate the cumulative probability of failure at each time step, 
the PDFs are converted into cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) by integrating over 
each time step as shown in Figure 6. It can take many years of degradation accumulation 
for there to be one hundred percent chance of failure, especially in iron pipes under low 
temperature exposures.    
 
 51 
 
Figure 6 Temperature-Failure CDFs. CDFs are shaded in light orange to dark 
orange as the corresponding temperatures increase.  
Each temperature-failure CDF represents the probability of failure of a component 
overtime given that it has been exposed to one specific temperature. In reality, however, 
components are exposed to multiple temperatures over their lifetimes. Therefore, to 
determine probability of failure of components, the temporal aspect of temperature 
exposure is considered. “Exposure” represents the temperature a component is exposed 
to, weighted by the amount of time the component is exposed. To calculate exposure 
values, duration and magnitude are multiplied to get units of degree-unit time (℃ ∙ Δ𝑡 ) as 
shown in Equation 1.  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	[℃ ∙ Δ𝑡] = 𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒[℃] ∙ 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[Δ𝑡] (1) 
This formulation of exposure assumes that magnitude and duration both have linear 
relationships with exposure. If there are any interactions between duration and 
magnitude, it may be the case that duration and magnitude have a non-linear relationship 
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with exposure, however. For example, the magnitude of exposure might increase as 
duration increases due to a feedback of additional amounts of heat generated from 
component degradation overtime. Without data available to analyze the exact nature of 
the relationship of exposure and its factors, it is uncertain as to which relationship is most 
accurate. Future studies could explore the results of employing an assumption of non-
linear relationships between magnitude and duration of exposure.  
A probability distribution of failure was generated for each component to reflect 
the effects of different exposure values over its lifespan. To generate the exposure-failure 
CDFs, probabilities from the temperature-failure CDFs with different durations and 
magnitudes of temperatures but with the same exposure values, were binned together and 
combined. Probability values from temperature-failure CDFs for the full range of 
historical and projected maximum daily temperatures in the City of Phoenix from 1950-
2099 (0-57℃) were used to generate probabilities within the exposure bins. To obtain a 
probability value for exposure values that did not reflect other forms of aging 
characterized by the Weibull probability distribution, probability values within each 
exposure bin were combined through averaging. The other mechanisms of aging create a 
difference of probability of failure within the same exposure bins. For example, a PVC 
pipe with a 1,000 ℃ ∙ yr exposure value under the combination of 20oC for 50 years has a 
higher probability of failure (0.6) than the combination 50oC for 20 years (0.2). The 
output temperature and exposed CDFs are shown in  Figure 7. They represent probability 
of failure for each type of component given a certain levels of exposure.  
 53 
 
 Figure 7 Exposure CDFs   
3.2.3 Modeling Component States 
In each time step, the simulation tracks the dynamic state of components relating 
to exposure, probability of failure, individual robustness, and operational state (failed or 
functional). The duration of each time step is set to the lowest increment of time taken to 
repair components, which is 2 hours for pumps. This time step ensures that pumps and 
pipes are replaced in the system when repairs are completed. The failure state of a 
component in any given time step is based on the probability of failure given its current 
exposure state at the component’s age, its level of individual robustness, and whether or 
not the repair time has passed if it had already failed in the previous time step. 
Component ages are tracked overtime by the simulation as they fail and become repaired. 
Once failed, the component will be assigned a duration for that failure, which models the 
time to repair the outage. When they are repaired, their age returns to zero. This assumes 
that repairs restore the component functionality to new.  
The components’ cumulative exposure is tracked in each time step to evaluate its 
probability of failure using the exposure CDF curves. To do this, temperature profiles are 
used to determine the temperature experienced in each time step. The temperature values 
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of the time step are multiplied by the duration of the time step to get the current exposure 
value (Equation 1). The exposure values are iteratively summed together to get a current 
overall exposure value. This follows the mathematical representation of degradation of 
components as a function of the cumulative exposure, Equation 2, that was introduced in 
Bondank et al 201846:  
𝑟+ = ` α ∙ 𝑇Ab 𝑑𝑡JcJE (2) 
Where rd is rate of degradation from exposure [lifespan/oC], Te is temperature 
experienced by the hardware [oC], and 𝛼 and ß are the linear and exponential parameters 
of degradation. 
The determination of whether a component has failed or not in a certain time step 
is then performed by comparing the probability of failure of the component population 
(i.e. all pumps or all PVC pipes) at the current exposure state to the component’s 
individual “robustness factor”, which is a random value from a uniform distribution 
ranging from 0 to 1 representing the component’s robustness or survivability compared to 
the rest of its population. Heterogeneities in components of the same type could arise 
from manufacturing defects or inconsistent treatment in operation across components. A 
uniform distribution is used because it is assumed that these heterogeneities cause 
random increases in the chance of individual component failure in each time step. The 
process of comparison of population probability of failure and individual robustness 
factors is shown in Figure 8. A component is determined to be in a failed state when its 
probability of failure is higher than its robustness factor. Robust components need more 
exposure to fail and less robust components need less exposure to fail.   
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Figure 8 Rules of Component Failure. Exposure CDF and robustness factors are 
compared to determine whether or not a component has failed in a certain time step. 
Determination for two example time steps, A and B are shown.  
 
3.2.4 Modeling Service Outages  
The component failure analysis is input into the hydraulic solver, EPANET, to 
estimate service outages in each time step. Service outages are defined in this study as 
time steps in which a demand node pressure drops within 20-40 psi (service loss outage) 
or below 20 psi (vacuum pressure outage).7 Multiple service outages can occur in one 
time step if multiple demand nodes are below pressure thresholds. EPANET is used as 
the hydraulic solver because it is authoritative and standard in that it 1) is the model of 
record for the U.S. EPA, and 2) because it is widely used by both academics and industry 
professionals. EPANET’s algorithm is “demand-driven” and therefore outages are 
represented in terms of pressure losses. An EPANET network file is uploaded into Perses 
to generate component attributes automatically.  
When components are failed, they are shut-off by changing their attributes within 
EPANET. Pipe statuses are set to “closed” to represent the response team isolating the 
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break using valves. Emitters are added to one node of the broken pipes to model water 
losses before operators are able to shut off valves to isolate the break. The magnitude of 
loss is modeled to be similar to what is experienced in fire-flow using a coefficient of 
100.7 Pumps are turned off by setting their status to “closed” as well. The change in status 
of components causes consequential pressure outages in nodes. The number of nodes that 
have outages is counted in each time step. Before counting service outages, however, 48 
hours is run in the beginning of the simulation to obtain the correct output once the 
system equilibrates. EPANET allows for demands to vary by the hour according to daily 
demand patterns. Since the demand patterns are in 1-hour increments, the hydraulic time 
steps are also in 1-hour increments. The general simulation approach is shown in SI 
Figure 2.  
 
3.3 Case Studies  
Two case studies are used to evaluate the effects of temperature on component 
failures and network service losses under extreme heat scenarios like those in the U.S. 
Southwest. A full set of network data including spatial topography of components, pump 
and demand curves, nodal elevations, tank sizes, and pipe diameters for a Southwestern 
city would be ideal for this study, but were not available. A system based on the number 
of components in the City of Phoenix, Arizona network without any topological or water 
flow information is first used for a component failure analysis. We call this the Large-
Scale System. The Large-scale System has populations of components representative of 
those in the City of Phoenix: 113 pumps and 61,500 pipes (7,000 total miles of pipe with 
600 foot segments). 176,177 Half of the pipes are modeled as iron and the other half PVC. 
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To perform an analysis of service losses, a widely available network from North Marin 
County in California is used. The network, while small relative to the City of Phoenix, 
provides an opportunity to assess the effects of rising temperatures on a realistic system, 
where service losses can be estimated. We call this network the Realistic Network and 
the layout is shown in Figure 9. The Realistic Network has been widely used for research 
purposes and is provided in the EPANET user manual.178–181 The network consists of 91 
nodes, 115 pipes (of which we estimate 17 are PVC and 98 are iron from the roughness 
factors), 3 storage tanks, 2 reservoirs, and 2 pumps and serves a suburban population of 
around 53,000 people.178 Nodal demands range from 0.87 to 1,856 gallons per minute. 
Details about the model including the pump head curves and controls are shown in 
Appendix B.3.1.  
The case studies are also characterized by the component ages and component repair 
times. The ages of pipes and pumps in Phoenix are unknown, and as such it is assumed 
that the Large-Scale and Realistic systems were built in 1950, corresponding to the start 
of significant population growth and provision of new infrastructure in the City of 
Phoenix. 182 The Perses simulation thus begins with new components in 1950 for both the 
Realistic and Large-scale network. Repair times are set at 88 hours for pipes, 5 hours for 
motors, and 4 hours for electronics, consistent with the mean-time-to-repairs reported in 
literature for US water systems.183 A sensitivity assessment is developed using varying 
repair times. The time associated with waiting for parts is not included in these mean 
repair times, but could be significant.  
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Figure 9 North Marin Water Distribution Network. Network is overlaid on a street 
and parcel map. 
For both case studies, the current and projected future temperature profiles for the 
City of Phoenix, Arizona, are used. Projections have 1/8-degree spatial resolution and 
were averaged spatially within the region bounded by latitudes 33.3125 to 33.8125 and 
longitudes -122.1875 to -111.9375 (2414 km2 that represent the City of Phoenix). There 
are 19 different climate models and 42 total runs in the RCP 4.5 emission scenario and 20 
climate models with 41 total runs in the RCP 8.5 emissions scenario. Figure 10  shows 
plots of the different temperature profiles over time. The range of the historical data (grey 
error band) represents the daily temperature extremes within the year between the 
maximum daily temperatures of the hottest and coolest days within each year. Average 
RCP projections represent the average temperature estimates from all the runs of all the 
climate models for all the days in each year. The range of the future projections (orange 
and red error bands) also represent the maximum daily temperatures of the hottest and 
coolest days of each year, but in addition they are estimated from the runs of climate 
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models which have either the hottest or coolest estimates of all of the runs of climate 
models within each RCP scenario. At the daily scale at which the temperature data are 
dynamically used in the model, there are no extremes in regards to durations of time (i.e. 
years), the only uncertainty involved is in regards to the estimates of runs of climate 
models for each day. The averages of the scenarios show a clear increase in temperatures 
into the future with RCP 4.5 average rising from roughly 30 to 32.5oC and RCP 8.5 
average to 35.5oC by end-of-century. The projections for the City of Phoenix are 
therefore cooler than the overall projections for the entire Southwest.  
 
 
Figure 10 Historical and Future Projections of Maximum Daily Temperatures in the 
City of Phoenix. The range of projection scenarios is 0.72 – 56.2oC.  
The averages of the climate models and runs of each emissions scenario (RCP 4.5 
and 8.5) seem to be more representative of climate dynamics than the extreme minimum 
and maximum climate model runs are. The extremes show much more variance of 
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variables, interactions and initial conditions from baseline projections than the averages 
do. Therefore, we anticipate the results from average projections to be realized but also 
present the results from the extremes to show the bounding cases of possibility as 
modeled in the set of GCMs.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Long-term Increases in Failures in the Large-scale System 
In the Large-scale system, future PVC pipe, pump, and iron failures exceed 
estimates for the baseline case. Figure 11 shows the projections of cumulative component 
failure over time under the minimum, average, and maximum climate projection 
scenarios as compared to the baseline. By 2099, the anticipated increase in failures from 
the average temperature profiles of the RCP 4.5 and 8.5 scenarios are 5-8% more pump 
failures, 13-15% more iron pipe failures, and 5-7% more PVC pipe failures above the 
baseline scenario. The bounds of possibility from the extremes of weather pattern 
assumptions within RCP 4.5 -8.5 are at maximum a 16-18% increase in pump failures, 
18-21% increase in PVC pipe failures, and 50% increase in iron pipe failures. The 
minimum bound of possibility of RCP 4.5-8.5 is a 7-9% decrease in pump failures, 8-
10% decrease in PVC pipe failures, and a 20-23% decrease in iron pipe failures.  
Components have different responses to cumulative heat exposure. Pumps and 
PVC pipes have a similar linear profile of yearly failure rates. Iron pipes experience 
exponential failure rates because it increases the rate of corrosion and therefore the rate 
of degradation of lifespan over time and not only the instantaneous percent of 
degradation of lifespan like is the case with pumps and PVC pipes. 17 Thus the impacts of 
temperature accumulate overtime for iron pipes. A result of this difference in behavior of 
 61 
failure is that the first iron pipe to fail after the system is built is in 1977 whereas the first 
pumps and PVC pipes fail right away, in year 1951. Though the trends of yearly failure 
are different between pumps and PVC pipes, and iron pipes, all components reach 100% 
of baseline temperatures at the same time – in the average RCPs its 99.7% through the 
simulation and in maximum RCPs its 98.9% through the simulation. After these times, 
the exceedance of baseline failures of iron pipes increases above that of pumps and PVC 
pipes.  
 
Figure 11 Cumulative Percentage of Baseline Component Failures in Large-scale 
System. 
The exceedance of baseline failures in the average RCP scenarios reveals 
potential challenges for budgeting, management, and maintenance. If emissions and 
climate model scenarios at or above the average are realized and budgets do not adjust to 
include the increased need for preventative or corrective maintenance, either additional 
service losses will be realized or a last minute reshuffling of municipal funds may occur 
that could result in lingering overall deficit.184 Because budgets are generated based on 
the past years’ expenditures and new projects, there is no formal process to include 
projections of increased failure rates.185 If utilities continue with this process of decision 
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making, they will have to see the pattern in the increased failures before they can budget 
in adaptation options. A survey of water utilities reveals that action is taken once 
extremes have been experienced.6 The timing of the occurrence of increased failures 
could be important for whether utilities sense the increased rates of failure and are able to 
incorporate the increase into their future budgets.  In the case of iron pipes, the large 
threshold of exposure needed to cause failure could cause situational surprise186 by the 
end of the century when suddenly iron pipes fail before their expected lifespans. Because 
the cumulative failure curves for pump failures and PVC pipes are linear, if monitoring 
failure rates, utilities will know soon that pumps and PVC are failing more frequently and 
may be able to incorporate it into future budgets. Some utilities in the Southwest already 
report that they experience an increase in PVC and pump failure with extreme heat and 
therefore expect further increases from climate change.6 
Historical data show that the model estimates of component failures under baseline 
temperature conditions are reasonable and thus serve as a source of validation for the 
model. The historical average failure rate of motors across a variety of industries in the 
US is on average 3-12% every year under current temperature conditions.10 The average 
annual pump failure rate from the large-scale model under baseline conditions is 1.69% 
per year, which is near the historical range.  The historical failure rates of polyethylene 
pipes, pipes with similar degradation rates to PVC pipes, in Las Vegas in 2005 was 6.5% 
over the year.6,134,157 The average failure rate of PVC pipe from the large-scale model 
under baseline conditions is 1.72%. Furthermore, current annual iron pipe break rates are 
reported to be 6% on average in the United States.141 The average failure rate of iron pipe 
from the large-scale model under baseline conditions is 0.001%. The discrepancy in 
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historical pipe break data and the modeled annual pipe failure rates shows that 
temperature related mechanisms of failure do not contribute as much to failures relative 
to other mechanisms of pipe failure—like freezing conditions, inadequate bedding 
support, or live loads caused by traffic, which are not modeled in this study. 129  
3.4.2 Long-term Increases in Failures in a Realistic Network  
In the Realistic network, future PVC pipe and pump failures exceed estimates for 
the baseline case, and the criticality of infrastructure components becomes apparent. 
Figure 12 shows the projections of cumulative component failure overtime under the 
minimum, average, and maximum climate projection scenarios as compared to the 
baseline. By 2099, there is projected to be no increase in iron pipe and pump failures but 
5% more PVC pipe failures than the baseline. The bounds of possibility from the 
extremes of weather pattern assumptions within RCP 4.5 -8.5 are at maximum a 25% 
increase in pump failures and a 15-16% increase in PVC pipe failures. The minimum 
bound of possibility of RCP 4.5-8.5 is a 25% decrease in pump failures, and a 10-13% 
decrease in PVC pipe failures.  
In the Realistic Network, there is a smaller population of components than in the 
Large-scale System and therefore, there are fewer overall component failures. Because of 
this, the times between component failures are longer and it produces step-wise instead of 
smooth cumulative failure curves. In the case of iron pipes, the reason there were no 
failures at all was because the low percentages of failure of components relative to the 
total number of iron pipes in the Large-Scale System, 0.1-0.15%, translated to only 0.1 
failure out of 98 iron pipes in the Realistic Network. Smaller utilities may not experience 
the increases in failure because they have fewer assets and therefore chances of failure. 
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Underlying trends of increases in component failure should therefore be interpreted from 
the Large-scale System. Additionally, though there are no projected increases in pump 
failures, the failures happen sooner under average and maximum projections than under 
baseline conditions. This could also be problematic because if failures happen sooner 
than expected under baseline conditions, they might not be covered in the budget in the 
years that the failures occur.  
 
Figure 12 Cumulative Percentage of Baseline Component Failures in Realistic 
Network 
Service outages (20-40 psi) that constitute inadequate pressure for domestic and 
commercial use are projected to increase by 3% above the baseline by 2099. Vacuum 
pressure service outages (below 20 psi) constituting inadequate pressure levels for fire-
flow and vacuum pressure, are projected to also increase by 3% above baseline 
projections, as shown in Figure 13. The bounds of possibility from the extremes of 
weather pattern assumptions within RCP 4.5 - 8.5 are at maximum a 26-27% increase in 
service outages and a 27% increase in vacuum pressure service outages. The minimum 
bound of possibility of RCP 4.5-8.5 is a 4-5% decrease in service losses, and a 3-4% 
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decrease in vacuum pressure service losses. Similar to preventative maintenance and 
capital improvement budgets, if repair/response budgets do not have enough room to 
allow for the increase in service outages and find themselves unable to adequately 
respond, outages could have greater durations, thereby causing greater loss to human 
health and economic opportunity. Furthermore, if budgets neglect proper corrective 
maintenance, it could further increase components’ chances of failure into the future.146 
This could cause the system to move into a state of deterioration that would be 
increasingly challenging to manage.146 Unfortunately, there are no data available on 
historical instances of water outages to validate findings at the service loss level. 
However, since we have validated component failures, the outages should be reasonable 
since they are calculated using a standardly- used hydraulic solver. 
 
Figure 13 Cumulative Percentage of Baseline Service Losses from Component 
Failures in Realistic Network 
Service outages are non-linear and emergent outcomes of the complex 
interactions between the component failures and the topology and flows within the 
network. This is evidenced by the fact that the number of service losses in the network 
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from component failures is not proportional to the number of component failures. For 
example, in year 33 of the simulation, 2 pipes failed and there were a resulting 6,511 
service losses, but in the year 50, 4 pipes failed and there were only 264 resulting service 
losses. The nonlinearity is a driver behind the aspect of components called “criticality” 
that is referenced in network science studies.187 Like other water reliability studies using 
simulation to find outages, we refer to critical components as ones that cause outages 
when failed.63,69 From evaluating where those components are located within the network 
we find results consistent with studies that rely on topology of the network --  the critical 
components are ones which serve as the sole connection between demand nodes and the 
source of water, whether it be the reservoir or from the rest of the network.58,59,61,183,188  
There are levels of criticality of components based on how many demand nodes 
the connecting component serves. Figure 14 shows the levels of criticality of components 
within the network from levels 1-5, with level one being the most critical. Criticality 
levels are characterized by the number of outages which occur when they fail. 
Components that are necessary for the initial conveyance of water out of the reservoir 
sources are most critical, especially those leading directly from reservoir 4 -- pipes 60, 
329, pump 335. When they fail, the greatest number of outages occur (>12,000 outages) 
since much of the network are reliant upon the sources. Pipes and the pump leading from 
reservoir 5 (pump 10 and pipe 101) are less critical, however. A reason for this might be 
that reservoir 5 has a lower elevation and therefore provides less pressure for the network 
than does reservoir 4. The second most critical components are pipes that serve as the 
only connections between sections of the network (Pipe 238, 240, 241, and 243). They 
cause 2,000-12,000 outages when they fail. The third-most critical are the pipes that 
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connect small portions of the network to the rest of the network (Pipes 247, 237, 249, and 
273). They cause 400-2,000 outages when they fail. Pipes that lead away from the 
network in a dendritic fashion to isolated nodes are fourth-most critical for individual 
nodes (Pipes 137, 149, 151, 180, 181, 185, 193, 233, 251, 257, 263, 277, and 291). They 
cause 1-400 outages when they fail. Components in level 5 criticality cause no outages 
when they fail. Overall, pumps are less critical than pipes. A failure of pump 10 has little 
effect (0-6 outages) and pump 335 causes 30-379 outages.. Criticality is the reason that 
the percent increases in outages from the maximum projection are greater that the 
decreases from the minimum projection. There was more opportunity for the critical 
component, pipe 329, to fail and cause many more outages.  
 
Figure 14 Criticality of Components in North Marin 
Components that are individually non-critical can become critical when they fail 
within a day or so of another component. For example, the critical pipe, 329, when failed 
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alone creates 6,427 service loss outages. When failed on the same day as a pipe that does 
not cause any failures by itself, pipe 261, there are 6,429 service loss outages. Another 
example is that when the minimally critical pipe, 137, fails by itself it produces 92 
service loss outages, but when failed within 6 days of an individually non-critical pipe, 
131, there are 96 service losses.  
 
3.5 Evaluating mitigation potential of adaptation strategies 
Contextual variables in the simulation that are temperature-independent represent 
opportunities for exploring how well adaptation strategies could mitigate failures from 
climate change. The two contextual variables which failures and outages are sensitive to 
are the operational parameters used to generate the temperature-failure CDFs, and the 
repair times of components. Ranges of operational parameters that produce relatively low 
probabilities of failure represent the implementation of improved preventative 
maintenance strategies. An example of a preventative maintenance strategy in this 
context is changing the range of internal heating in motors within pumping units. When 
the internal heating from friction of the bearings is kept at 100-105oC via good bearing 
lubrication practice, the motor has a lower probability of failure than if the internal 
heating is kept at 105-110oC via poor lubricating practice.11 
To evaluate how well preventative maintenance and fast repair times could mitigate 
outages, we compare the percent of additional outages from climate change that were 
offset from implementing three independent possible adaptation strategies: (1) improved 
preventative maintenance at 50% above mid-levels, (2) improved repair times at 50% 
above mid-levels (i.e., 88 and 8 hours respectively), and (3) both improved preventative 
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maintenance and repair times 50% above mid-levels. We then explore why those offsets 
occurred and form recommendations from the findings. We explore how strategies would 
offset failures if either the average or maximum projections within each RCP were 
realized. The minimum projections are not included because they produce fewer failures 
than baseline scenarios and therefore would require no offsets from strategies. The 
strategies are compared based on the number of times they offset the additional failures 
from climate change, which we refer to as “factor of offsets”. Figure 15 shows the 
different resulting offsets provided by each strategy under the different temperature 
scenarios.  
 
Figure 15 Offsets of Additional Failures from RCP 4.5 Average Temperature 
Projections 
An exploration of the mitigation potential of adaptation strategies shows that (1) 
strategies are capable of offsetting 100% of the additional failures from climate change, 
(2) improvements in repair times offset the most outages, and (3) strategies have different 
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effects under different climate futures. Improved preventative maintenance offsets 
outages by decreasing component failures. For pumps, improved preventative 
maintenance will provide a 3-5 factor offset under average temperature conditions and a 
1.5 factor offset under maximum temperature conditions.  For iron pipes, improved 
preventative maintenance will provide a 5-6 factor offset under average temperature 
conditions and a 2 factor offset under maximum temperature projections. Offsets of PVC 
failures never reach a factor of 1 in any temperature scenario. Improved preventative 
maintenance will provide a 23% offset of additional PVC failures under average 
temperature conditions and 7% at maximum temperature conditions. These component 
failure offsets translate to a 1.4 factor offset of service outages. Improved repair times 
offset service outages directly without offsetting component failures. Implementing 
improved repair times has a 3.4-3.8 factor offset of all service outages under average 
conditions. Improving repair times is therefore about three times as effective for reducing 
the duration of outages than is improving preventative maintenance. Improved 
preventative maintenance paired with improved repair times produce an even greater 
offset at a factor of 4-4.5 times. An additional insight is that the comparison of offsets 
across average and maximum projections reveals that both repair and preventative 
strategies are less effective in hotter futures, especially for improved repair time 
strategies. This is because there are more failures to offset at higher temperature 
projections, and the strategies only provide a constant decrease in failures. Therefore, 
utilities should expect different levels of offsets from strategies depending on which 
temperatures are realized out to the end of the century.  
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3.6 Discussion 
The Perses model shows the capability of a dynamic extended period simulation to 
aid decision making about climate adaptation by estimating the impacts to consumers. 
The use of Perses for projecting failures from increasing temperatures in water 
distribution systems shows that utilities in the Southwestern region of the U.S. that 
experience high temperatures will likely experience increases in component and 
consequential service level outages to consumers. If allowance is not provided in budgets 
for the increased need for repair, replacement, and response required from increased 
failures, and for maintaining the quality of repairs, outages to consumers could be more 
frequent and could extend even to longer periods. 
The knowledge Perses generates could be especially useful for resilient decision-
making regarding assessing consequences and management strategies since the American 
Water Infrastructure Act passed in October 2018 requires US utilities to conduct 
resilience assessments to natural hazards.43 As utilities in warm regions of the US 
conduct their assessments, they could use the Perses results especially for improving the 
“Consequence Analysis” and the “Risk and Resilience Management” steps in their 
assessments as suggested by the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset 
Protection (RAMCAP) Standard for Risk and Resilience Management of Water and 
Wastewater Systems which serves as guidance for compliance with the new law.5 The 
RAMCAP standard calls for an estimation of the duration and severity of service outage 
that could result from a hazard. This is then used to define resilience as a function of the 
duration and severity of consequence instead of just the estimation of ultimate 
consequence. They ask that utilities “do not assume that all uncontrollable variables and 
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unpredictable events occur simultaneously”.5 Therefore, a more detailed knowledge of 
time and space is needed to estimate this aspect. Additionally, the evaluation of the 
results under different maintenance scenarios using Perses also helps with “assessing the 
options by analyzing the facility or asset under the assumption that the option has been 
implemented—” by “re-estimat[ing] the risk and resilience levels and calculating the 
estimated benefits of the option.” Utilities could improve the context considered by 
inputting utility specific information like the number and topology of components and 
demand profiles.  
There are aspects of resilience dependent upon an understanding of social 
capacity, transformative designs, and system decompensation that are not yet considered. 
Perses does not yet quantify the impacts to the communities from experiencing service 
losses. The low pressures that constitute outages could be translated to loss of demand (in 
gallons per minute) and the consequence of different consumers losing this amount of 
water could be estimated according to their critical need. Including this in future versions 
of Perses could help utility managers better prioritize where they will invest in adaptation 
options for specific locations in their networks so that their most vulnerable populations 
remained served under increasing hardware stress.52 Additionally, system 
decompensation, representing the diminished “capacity to deploy and mobilize responses 
as disturbances grow and cascade” from neglected budgets, 189 could be incorporated into 
Perses by having components repaired to lower levels in response to constrained budgets.  
The applicability of Perses to water systems decision-making is specific to certain 
spatial and temporal contexts. Perses is applicable to a certain type of climate in warm 
regions that does not experience freezing temperatures (e.g. the US Sun Belt, Middle 
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East, North Africa, and South Asia). In cold regions, the effects of temperature include 
additional dynamics regarding changing freeze-and-thaw cycles which have a large 
impact on pipe breaks. 22 Additionally, Perses is most applicable to structure of water 
infrastructure that is currently prevalent in developed countries today. Future designs of 
water systems that for example incorporate decentralization, direct reuse treatment, and 
more robust materials, could transform the nature of the relationship of the hazard to the 
system, thereby changing the form Perses would take to aid decision-making. Perses 
could model the impact of temperature on some of the hardware components of more 
decentralized systems, e.g., pumps and pipes in rainwater treatment systems, but would 
need to consider more internal dynamics of how a hardware failure causes systemic 
failure of the rainwater treatment system. Additionally, if systems that connect 
wastewater treatment to water treatment and water distribution become more common, 
Perses could account for the increased number of connections in the network that could 
cause more widespread cascades of failure and therefore more service losses. 
Additionally, building robustness into the material design of the hardware could be 
included in the model, decreasing the initial impact of temperature exposure. Improving 
the robustness of materials used for motors, electronics, and pipes would reduce the rate 
of temperature-related degradation and the need for any action to counter act the 
temperature rise.  
The analysis of adaptation strategies to temperature effects does not consider costs or 
all of the stressors need to make complete practical recommendations for utilities. 
Including cost in the comparisons of adaptation strategies may produce different 
recommendations of strategies. The functional unit in this analysis is one independent 
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adaptation strategy. If costs of improvements of strategies were quantified, the functional 
unit could be the benefit from strategies provided by an investment dollar amount. The 
repair times which cost as much as preventative maintenance may offset fewer failures 
than the preventative maintenance strategy because they are relatively expensive.127 For 
example, for pipes, it may take a lot more money to reduce repair times to consistently 44 
hours for all failed components than it would be to invest in reducing corrosion. 
Additionally, the analysis of these strategies does not include other mechanisms of 
degradation which contribute to our infrastructure aging crisis. 127 There is evidence that 
in the case where many of the pipes are at the end of their useful life at once, strategies 
like rehabilitation or scheduled replacement are much less costly than relying on 
repair.127 
Ultimately, Perses shows the potential for simulation methods to aid water 
infrastructure decision-making by providing the basis to consider dynamic parameters 
and spatially-explicit aspects of the system. Climate impacts to other infrastructure 
systems that depend upon network connections and operations of the flow of materials 
could be modeled in a similar fashion considering the specific mathematical formulations 
of degradation from the hazard, component operations, and the connections between 
components. We ultimately hope that using spatial and temporally explicit information 
becomes a more common practice for anticipating and preparing for changing conditions 
which underlie successful provision of vital infrastructure services.  
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CHAPTER 4 
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING INTERDEPENDENT POWER AND WATER 
SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction 
Interdependencies between infrastructure systems present management challenges for 
utilities in maintaining reliable service. Though infrastructure systems are managed 
separately, they share common space and can require inputs from one another to 
operate.92 Thus, the vulnerability of failure of one infrastructure system can propagate to 
other connected infrastructure systems. One historical example of an occurrence of 
vulnerability propagation is Baltimore’s Howard Street tunnel event where the fire from a 
derailed freight train caused traffic congestion, fiber optic cable damage and a 
telecommunication outage, along with a water main break. The water main break then 
caused flooding of transformers that resulted in power outages to 1,200 people in 
downtown Baltimore.93 The vulnerability of infrastructure systems given their 
interdependencies is only predicted to become more of a challenge as the connectivity 
with information and communications infrastructure increases 109,117,119 and as climate 
change increases the reliance on services of other infrastructure systems. 47,99,116 The 
ability to manage interdependencies is becoming a more complex task.190 
Though appropriate in the past, literature suggests that separate management of 
infrastructure systems may limit the capacity to prepare systems for disturbances. The 
“dichotomy of responsibility” was developed due to “the global push toward safety, 
accountability, and higher efficiency”.191  “The mechanistic approach has been shown to 
be…effective in environments that require routine operation and little change. In these 
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environments high-level management possesses the appropriate amount of knowledge to 
make decisions and organize work”.119 This type of structure was desirable in the 20th 
century “since it was the first time they reached such as large scale and level of 
complexity”.191 However, “This separation of responsibility inhibit[s] communication 
and coordination between departments”, and leads to “solutions that are oriented around a 
short-term, stable system perspective”.191 Under these conditions, “in some instances, 
incremental adaptation can actually lead to the degradation of a safety-control structure 
over time due to asynchronous evolution, where one careful change is made, but fails to 
relate with changes in connected parts.190 In such cases, flawed expectations about the 
behavior of the change may lead to undesired consequences”.128,192 
There is evidence that infrastructure utilities are limited by lack of communication. 
The use of incomplete information about the state of other utilities’ infrastructure and 
their plans for improvement produces sub-optimal vulnerability mitigation strategies. For 
example, after the 2003 Northeast blackout, the water utilities which had outages of their 
power supply expressed the desire to communicate with power utilities to “learn about 
isolating failures and creating redundancy”.114 Unfortunately, power utilities did not want 
to share information because of the competitive nature of the information. One water 
utility ultimately resorted to hiring an outside consultant in order to assess the reliability 
of their infrastructure because of the challenge of information sharing from the power 
utility.114 Additionally, a lack of communication breeds false expectations between 
utilities. A study on decision-making within interdependent infrastructure systems shows 
that utilities try to anticipate what other utilities are doing to try to benefit from their 
decisions and reduce their own costs, especially regarding adaptation strategies that affect 
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all of the utilities in the geographic region.193 However, because they do not 
communicate, (1) the utilities incorrectly anticipate benefits, and (2) the acting utilities do 
not factor the perceived benefits to the other utilities into their decision making.193  
 The incomplete information about other infrastructure systems leave the 
following questions unanswered for utilities:  Where are the locations in the network that 
are vulnerable to propagation of failure from interdependencies? How much 
vulnerability do interdependencies cause? Considering the lack of direct information, 
modeling the causes of the propagation of failure between utilities can help answer these 
questions. Utilities can gain insights about possible failure events from past failures of 
different utilities, but this information is also insufficient because utilities cannot expect 
the same exact impacts to occur due to their different contexts. For example, the water 
utilities affected by the 2003 Northeast Blackout were all affected differently due to their 
differing network configurations.194  Therefore, to anticipate pathways of failure 
propagation and vulnerability impacts for specific utilities, a predictive or exploratory 
model of interdependencies, contextual information about the utility, and the 
consequential outcomes would help utilities explore impacts for their specific systems. 
There are not enough case study data available to generate a statistical predictive model, 
so a model exploring the effects of the underlying dynamics would be useful. Current 
models of interdependencies are insufficient to answer questions about propagation and 
vulnerabilities, however. Reliability and climate change impact assessments include 
quantitative information about interdependencies to better understand the strength of 
connections.47,78,98–107,79,108–113,80,88,93–97 These studies focus on long-term use of resources 
and topographic connections, which do not provide information to determine 
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vulnerability from failure. Current failure propagation interdependency studies typically 
only use graph topologies without flow information.96,103,110 Studies suggesting new 
model frameworks confirm that interdependency models should include more 
information. They recommend considering structure, flow characteristics 106, system 
operation 109,117, and temporal aspects 97. This additional information would facilitate 
anticipating where, how, and under what operational circumstances the interdependencies 
could manifest given their spatial and operational context, and therefore how widespread 
resulting outages could be.  
In addition to improving communication across utilities, literature suggests 
developing coordination between infrastructure managers, arguing that it could lead to 
more effective vulnerability mitigation. Derrible argues that “A more coordinated and 
better planned integration is highly desirable” because integrated systems can consider 
more of society’s needs (health, equity, overall efficiency) (Derrible, 2017). Chester & 
Allenby (2018) citing Larence and Lorsch (1967) argue “Organic [organizational] 
structures allow for more internal specialization to respond to changing environments, 
thereby increasing responsiveness”118 because “distributing the knowledge and decision-
making at the bottom of the hierarchy becomes more effective when  the environment [in 
which infrastructure operate] becomes unstable and high-level management cannot 
acquire all of the knowledge associated with the changing environment (Sherehiy et al., 
2007)”.119,120 This generates the question for utilities, do coordinated institutional 
strategies between utilities have the potential to reduce vulnerability better than other 
institutional strategies? Models which identify the pathways of failure propagation can 
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serve as a baseline to explore different institutional strategy inputs to see how well they 
can mitigate failures.   
 
4.2 Case Study Approach 
Since sufficient modeling frameworks are not yet available, we present a modeling 
framework which uses real-time simulation of coupled network models and a case study 
of a specific coupled network to answer the questions: How can utilities model 
propagation of failure from interdependencies and anticipate vulnerability? and How can 
they use these models to explore effects of institutional strategies? This modeling 
framework could then be used to answer the questions posed in the introduction for other 
specific coupled networks. The case study includes (1) a description of the pathways of 
failure propagation and outages, which characterize vulnerability, that result from an 
initial hardware failure and an example set of dependencies in the coupled networks, and 
(2) a comparison of the avoided outages from implementation of institutional strategies 
within and across the infrastructure systems. We use flow-based infrastructure networks 
that incorporate temporal and spatial information and are connected to each other through 
operational resource needs and geographic location. The individual connections are 
unidirectional dependencies which together form interdependencies between the 
networks since “the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of 
the other”.92 We hope that this case study will provide motivation for utilities and 
researchers to further explore resulting failure propagations and outages and coordinated 
institutional strategies for different coupled networks with different configurations and 
dependencies. 
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We use a case study of the interdependencies between water and power distribution 
networks because they are critical lifeline infrastructure systems, there are a variety of 
types of interdependencies between them, their interdependencies are expected to grow 
stronger in the future, and their interdependencies are largely unexplored at the 
operational level. The disruption of water or power systems poses a significant threat to 
human health and economic activity. For example, in the 2003 Northeast blackout, 50 
million people were without power for around 4 days195 and parts of Detroit and 
Cleveland experienced temporary water outages that resulted in boil water advisories and 
in one case, the National Guard was called in to distribute water to the elderly and the 
frail.196 The blackout was also estimated to have caused $6.4 billion dollars of economic 
loss due to productivity impacts, costs to governments and utilities, and lost or spoiled 
commodities.197  In this example, the failure was due to the physical interdependency 
between water pumps and electricity. There are other physical and geographic 
interdependencies between the water and power systems according to Rinaldi et al.’s 
classifications.198 The physical interdependencies between the systems are through water 
pumps, valves, and SCADA’s need for power,7,114 and in the drop in power generator 
capacity from lack of treated water for cooling.116 Geographic interdependencies include 
possible transformer flooding from pipe break 115 and the transient overvoltage effect of a 
unexpected failure of a large water pump.199 Future conditions such as climate change, 
population growth, and increasing complexity threaten to make these connections 
stronger, therefore increasing the vulnerability of propagation. For example both power 
and water hardware are expected to fail more frequently from increased heat exposure, 
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46,47 and increased residential and generator demand from heat and increase in population 
served for the same amount of infrastructure is expected to further stress the systems.114  
Existing efforts at identifying water-power interdependencies reveal what the 
physical interdependencies are that could potentially cause a cascade of failures under the 
right circumstances. They are beneficial for showing how much the production of one 
resource requires of the other resource and vice versa.78,79,98–100,200–202 Studies with 
projections into the future include actionable suggestions about conservation measures to 
sustainably decrease demands 78 or predictions of how much new infrastructure might be 
built to accommodate coupled rising demands.79 Optimization models even help utilities 
decide how much output to produce to sustain interdependent systems. 200,201 Water-
power interdependency studies that address how failure events could cascade into the 
other infrastructure systems consider temporal flows of water and power within spatially 
contextual networks, but focus on contingency scenarios of component failure and only 
include physical interdependencies.113,203 
 
4.3 Case Study Description 
We build and simulate a realistic coupled water-power network using the 
hydraulic solver, EPANET, the power flow simulator, OpenDSS, and a coupled network 
solver we helped develop called the Resilient Infrastructure Simulation Environment 
(RISE). To identify the pathways of failure propagation, we establish dependency 
connections between components within the networks and a set of rules that cause 
propagation of failure through the dependency during the simulation (e.g. if real power at 
a load is zero, then connected water pumps fail). We then simulate the coupled network 
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over a short period of time until all resulting failures have occurred under the single-
hardware scenario (a few minutes) and see which dependencies had failures propagate 
through them given the initial failure. To estimate how much of a threat 
interdependencies can pose to reliable service, we count the resulting outages at demand 
nodes. For water systems, an outage is considered to occur when the pressure at the node 
goes below 40 psi.7 For power systems, an outage is considered to occur when real power 
drops to zero. We calculate the percentage of the demand nodes that have outages within 
the interdependent network and compare to the percentage of demand nodes that have 
outages within the uncoupled independent networks from the same initial hardware 
failure. To answer whether coordinated institutional strategies between utilities have the 
potential to reduce vulnerability better than other institutional strategies, we compare the 
number of avoided outages from the implementation of individual institutional strategies.  
4.3.1 Network Configuration 
Example power and water networks are modeled separately and then connected 
through their dependencies. The example electric power network is modeled using the 
IEEE 14-bus system for a single distributed generation network.204 The 14-bus system 
operates at 12 and 120 line-to-line kV and consists of 2 generating units, 9 loads, 9 
distribution line branches, 4 transformers, and 2 capacitors. The input data are shown in 
the respective data sheets.204 OpenDSS models assume a constant power model  wye-
grounded connection, minimum per-unit (PU) voltage of 0.9, and maximum PU voltage 
of 1.1 for the generating units and loads according to NERC example voltage deviation 
standards.205 
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There is no existing water network that is complementary to the IEEE 14-bus 
system so we generated one using the power loads and network layout. A water distribution 
network was generated based on the text network provided in the EPANET manual that 
spatially (i.e., location) and functionally (i.e., rated capacity) complements the IEEE 14-
bus electric power system.206 The water network contains one source of water modeled as 
a reservoir in EPANET, 2 tanks throughout the network that store and cycle water, 2 
pumps, and 14 junctions or nodes with water demands. Appendix B includes all input data 
for the water network. 
The base average annual water demand of the junctions was modeled by calculating 
the population served by the power load and then calculating what the water demand would 
be for that same population. We calculated the number of power customers at each node 
by converting the peak single-phase power of load into three-phase power and dividing by 
the per customer electric load value of 5.8 kW per customer.207 Electric power customer 
demand at each node was used to estimate the water demand at each node. It was assumed 
that each electric customer is a domestic unit, and that a domestic unit in Phoenix consists 
of 2.85 people.208 The number of people at each junction was then multiplied by the per 
capita water demand value of 0.792 gallons per minute.209  
4.3.2 Network Solvers 
Water and power flows between the sources of the resources and the nodes that 
require resources (demand nodes) were calculated using topological and temporal 
information about rate of supply. The software program, EPANET was used to solve the 
hydraulics of the water distribution network 206. EPANET calculates pressures at demand 
nodes given rates of inputs from reservoirs and tanks, considering elevation, and the 
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increases in pressure provided by pumping units. OpenDSS was used to solve the power 
flow of the power distribution system 210. OpenDSS “captures both the time- and 
location-dependent value of distributed generation by modeling distributed generation in 
its actual location on the circuit and by having extraordinary loadshape modeling 
capability to support sequential time simulations” 210. To connect the networks through 
their dependencies in real time, we use RISE 211. RISE allows users to (1) generate water 
and power networks and place them on the same map, (2) place different types of 
dependency connections between individual components across the networks, (3) change 
operational settings of components to explore causing failure or bringing service back 
after failure, and (4) run a solver that considers dependency connections for a chosen 
time step. When a hardware component fails and is connected to a component in the other 
network, the logic from the interdependency connection will cause that component to 
also fail (geographic interdependency). When a demand node loses service and is 
connected to a component in another system, the logic from the interdependency 
connection will cause the component to lose capacity to operate relative to the amount of 
flow lost (physical interdependency). Therefore, although the possible dependency 
connections are input into the model from case studies, the real time occurrence of failure 
propagation and the resulting outages are emergent from the initiating failure, the 
network topology, and flows overtime. 
 
4.3.3 Dependencies  
The dependencies modeled in the case study are those connecting water pumps 
and power loads. One dependency is the physical connection from power loads to water 
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pumps due to the water pumps’ need for power. The other dependency is the geographic 
connection from water pumps to power loads from the possible transient overvoltage 
effect of an unexpected failure of a large water pump. Together these dependencies form 
a case study of the interdependencies between the networks.  
4.3.4 Coupled Network 
An overview of the coupled network modeled in RISE is shown in Figure 16. The 
water network is displayed in blue, the power network is displayed in orange, and the 
interdependency connections are displayed in green. The networks were overlaid onto an 
example map showing that power lines and water pipes roughly follow the street 
network. The data of the networks has no direct tie to the geographic location of the map.  
 
 
Figure 16 Water and Power Coupled Network Case Study in RISE 
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4.4 Emergent Failure Propagation Pathways and Resulting Vulnerability  
The emergent propagation of failure through dependencies and the resulting 
vulnerability from interdependencies for the case study coupled network is illustrated 
with an initiating single-hardware failure. The consequential emergent failure events are 
described in detail below. The failure events in the case study are categorized using 
terminology from Rinaldi et al 200192 and the distinction between direct and indirect 
from Markolf et al 2019212 to demonstrate examples of the theoretical types of failures. In 
Rinaldi et al 2001 “orders” represent the number of times failures have propagated across 
systems, “cascading” failures specifically refer to outages that occur in one system 
because of a propagated failure from the other system, and “escalating” failures are ones 
that happened without interdependencies but were exacerbated by interdependencies.92 In 
Markolf et al 2019, direct physical failures are those which are characterized as “impact 
to physical infrastructure” while indirect physical failures are characterized as “disruption 
resulting from other interconnected or co-located infrastructure”.212 It should be noted 
that in different configurations of coupled networks with different types of dependencies 
at different locations and under different initial failure conditions, different failure events 
and vulnerabilities from interdependencies would emerge. 
To initiate the events, a pump in the water system (Pump 2) is failed (set to closed 
in the EPANET model). Example stressors that cause pumps to fail are age, heat stress, or 
flooding.6 The lack of pressure produced by the failed  pump then causes a decrease in 
pressure within the network, and consequentially water junction 18 drops below the 
reliability threshold of 40 psi. Junction 18 has a high elevation relative to other junctions 
and needs Pump 2 to be operational in order to receive adequate pressure. A close up 
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view of the connection between Pump 2 and Load 675 and the graphical representation of 
the water junction 18 service outage is shown in Figure 17. The dotted lines represent the 
pressure thresholds of safe operation. The area below the 40-psi threshold in the graph is 
shown in red. Red arrows point to the time step of interest for each failure event.  
 
Figure 17 Direct Physical Failure and Service Outage Outcomes. The pressure at 
Junction 18 drops to below the 40-psi threshold. Junctions 16 and 17 have the same 
pressure. 
Since Pump 2 and power Load 675 are connected and pump 2 has a large power 
load of 225 kW, the sudden failure of the pump causes a transient spike (downward) in 
the power network at Load 675 because power is no longer being used for the operation. 
This effect characterizes a first-order cascading effect from the interdependency with the 
water network. Figure 18 shows the location and effects of the drop in Load 675. 
 
Figure 18 First Order Indirect Physical Failure. Pump 2 failure causes Load 675 to 
drop. 
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The transient spike at Load 675 causes an imbalance of voltage in the power grid 
assuming that the synchronous generator’s output is not adjusted in time. The spike in 
voltage causes lines 1 and 2 to exceed their continuous ampacity of 250 amperes. The 
assumption is made that when lines exceed continuous ampacity the lines trip. Figure 19 
shows the locations of the tripped lines within the network and shows the graph of the 
current magnitudes with a highlight of when the current exceeded the continuous 
ampacity.  
 
 
Figure 19: Secondary and Tertiary Indirect Physical Failures. Currents rise in power 
lines and cause trips in lines 1 and 2. 
 
The tripping of the aforementioned power lines then causes a blackout where 
Open DSS calculates that all power loads drop to zero. Figure 20 shows a graph of the 
real power of three example loads from the network dropping to zero after the lines trip.  
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Figure 20 Cascading Service Outage Outcome. All power loads drop to zero. 
The drops in Load 646 and 611 trigger a second order cascading failure, this time 
from the power network to the water network. It is assumed that Pumps 1 and 3 require 
power from the grid to operate. Therefore, when Loads 646 and 611 drop to zero, Pumps 
1 and 3 fail from lack of power. Figure 21 shows a close up of the connections between 
the loads and the pumps.  
 
 
Figure 21 Second Order Indirect Physical Failures. Pump 1 and pump 3 fail from loss 
of power at loads 646 and 611 respectively. 
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The second order cascading failure causes further service outage outcomes for the 
water network. The outages of Pumps 1 and 3 further decrease the pressures in the water 
network and EPANET calculates that the pressures at water junctions 16 and 17 drop 
below the reliability threshold of 40 psi. The pump failures also cause an escalating 
failure of junction 18 which drops even farther below the reliability threshold.  Figure 22 
shows a graph of the drop in pressure of junctions 16, 17, and 18.  
 
 
 
Figure 22 Cascading Service Outage Outcome. Water outages at junctions 16, 17, and 
3 and escalating failure from interdependency causes an increased outage at Junction 18. 
 
To evaluate the vulnerability interdependencies cause in terms of how many 
outages occur from the failure propagation, the number of outages that occurred in 
independent networks and the interdependent networks are compared. Figure 8 shows a 
comparison of the failure events and outages that are anticipated. Without considering 
interdependencies in this scenario, water utilities would assume that only one water 
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demand node is vulnerable from a failure of Pump 2. From considering the cascading 
effects through the power system and back to the water system, they would know that 
three more demand nodes are vulnerable to failure and the node that initially failed, fails 
to an even larger degree due to the interdependencies. This translates to water outages of 
an additional 22% of demand nodes. Without exploring the interdependencies, all power 
outages are unanticipated (100% of all demand nodes). Figure 23 also shows the 
categories of failures based off Rinaldi et al 2001 and Markolf et al 2019 
terminology.92,212 
 
Figure 23 Comparison of Sequence of Events and Outages within Interdependent 
and Independent Networks 
 
4.5 Potential of Coordinated Strategies Between Utilities 
At each stage of propagation of failure, there are institutional strategies (including 
planning and operational) which could be implemented to either prevent hardware failure 
or prevent the cascade of failure. The RISE simulation of the single-hardware scenario 
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assumed no institutional actions were taken and therefore modeled a worst-case scenario 
cascade. Example actions which could prevent failures in the single-hardware scenario 
are listed below and categorized according to those which prevent hardware failure and 
which prevent cascades.  
(1) Water utilities preventing hardware failure through either: 
a. Improved preventative maintenance (e.g. improved bearing lubrication 
and motor cooling10)  
b. Rehabilitation (e.g. scheduled replacement of pumps125) 
c. Robustness (e.g. improving pump insulation capacity10) 
(2) Water utilities preventing cascade of failure through either: 
a. Redundancy (e.g. water utilities installing redundant pumps125) 
b. Operational response (e.g. increasing the levels of the water tanks to 
provide pressure7) Either handbook or EPANET manual.  
c. Repair response (e.g.  repair Pump 2 in time to prevent load imbalance and 
junction outages125)  
(3) Power utilities preventing cascade of failure through: 
a. Operational response (e.g. using a congestion management 
procedure213,214) 
Figure 24 shows when in the progression of failure these institutional strategies could 
help prevent failure.  
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Figure 24 Institutional Failures Causing Physical Failures in Single-hardware 
Failure Scenario 
We compare reductions of outages of each strategy to identify which have the 
most failure mitigation potential. The effect of the implementation of strategies estimated 
through the use of the fault progression generated by the single-hardware simulation in 
RISE. We assume that wherever a strategy would be implemented within the progression, 
it would prevent the next failure from happening and therefore all of the resulting 
cascades of that failure as well. We compare individual strategies independently, but in 
future studies multiple combined strategies could be considered. Figure 25 shows the 
percent of water, power, and total number of outages avoided under different institutional 
strategies as compared to the number of outages which occurred in the single-hardware 
scenario where no strategies were applied. The strategies which water utilities could use 
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to prevent cascades of failures were further separated into groups of strategies which 
produced the same outcomes (i.e. redundancy and operational response, and fast 
hardware repair). In contrast, power utilities only have one type of strategy that could 
prevent cascades, in this case -- operational response.   
  
Figure 25 Percent of Outages Avoided from Institutional Strategies in Single-
hardware Failure Scenario. (-W) signals that the strategy would be implemented by the 
water utility and (-P) signals that the strategy would be implemented by the power utility.  
The outcomes of institutional strategies in this example coupled network show 
that when comparing institutional strategies, coordination between utilities has the 
potential to produce strategies that are most effective at reducing overall vulnerability 
from outages. The strategy which avoids the largest percentage of outages for both water 
and power utilities in this case study is preventing Pump 2 failure via preventative 
maintenance, rehabilitation, and/or robustness in the water system. This strategy was the 
only one to mitigate all power, water, and total outages. Power utility operational 
response would avoid the same amount of power outages, however, it is not as effective 
of a strategy for water utilities and the overall consumer base. Thus, when planning to 
prevent this pathway of failure propagation, if both power and water utilities channeled 
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resources toward preventing pump 2 hardware failure, this could be a more effective 
strategy than both utilities using resources on separate strategies for each system. When 
using this modeling framework to aid decision making, multiple initiating failure events 
should be explored to identify a variety of pathways of failure propagation and the 
different institutional strategies that best prevent outages from them.  
It seems obvious that the prevention of the initiating failure would be the most 
effective strategy, but in a coupled network with different characteristics, other strategies 
maybe just as effective. The best strategy was a result of the characteristics of the pump 
that failed and its location within the coupled network. The size of the pump dictated the 
amount of power it demanded and therefore the amount of power load drop, and the 
water outages that occurred from the pump failure were an emergent outcome of the 
criticality of the pump within the network and the water flow calculations. If pump 2 did 
not have a load large enough to cause power imbalance, no cascades of failure would 
have happened. If pump 2 was in a less critical position in the network, Junction 18 may 
not have failed. If this was the case, the operational response from the power utilities 
would have the same percent of water outage reduction as preventing the hardware 
failure does.  
 
4.6 Discussion and Future Research 
This case study shows a framework for modeling how failures can propagate 
across infrastructure systems in real time, which improves the knowledge we have about 
how interdependencies can cause additional vulnerability for utilities. Instead of only 
considering the resource flows between networks or the number of connection points, 
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adding information about whether interdependencies cause failures given the resource 
flows within the network configurations, the operational settings of the components, and 
the operational management strategies, allows for anticipation of outages due to 
interdependencies. Anticipating outages from example propagations of failure in turn 
allows for the evaluation of outcomes from different institutional strategies both within 
and across systems. The result of the evaluation of strategies of this case study shows that 
there is potential for infrastructure systems managers to minimize impacts of 
interdependencies across systems by coordinating with other utilizes. We hope utilities 
use this finding as motivation to explore the possible benefits of coordinated strategies 
across utilities in their systems considering their specific network configurations and 
dependencies. 
There are multiple avenues of future work that could enhance the modeling 
framework’s capacity to aid decision making. We suggest exploring the impacts of 
simulating multiple networks, dependencies, and initial failures to gain general insights 
on how propagation of failures occur and how strategies reduce outages. We also suggest 
improving the characterization of institutional strategies, projecting impacts and benefits 
over longer periods of time, and modeling the response of coupled systems under future 
hazards. Institutional strategies could be better characterized in terms of types, levels, and 
cost. There are more types of planning and operational actions available to utilities 
besides preventative maintenance, corrective repair, and real time operational response. 
For example, utilities could redesign the structure of the networks or preventatively 
replace components. A model that includes all possible institutional actions would help 
utilities compare and prioritize actions for practical decision making. This would require 
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consulting utility managers to learn all of the actions available and developing ways to 
model those actions. Additionally, in reality, strategies provide levels of failure 
mitigation potential according to how many resources are invested in them. To model the 
avoided outages from different levels of strategies, aspects of the system should be 
dependent on quantities of strategies. For example, levels of preventative maintenance 
could be characterized by quantitative parameters in the probability distributions of 
hardware failure, and repair strategies could be characterized by the time it takes to repair 
like was done in the study about water distribution failure in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. Utilities could then also compare implementing levels of different strategies 
simultaneously, which more closely resembles reality than choosing only individual 
strategies to explore. Exploring levels of strategies according to the allocation of 
resources would shed light on the cost-effectiveness of strategies, which is a more 
realistic decision-making metric than failure mitigation effectiveness. Another 
improvement would be to simulate the cumulative impacts of strategies overtime. This 
would help explore whether choosing strategies for short term objectives provides a 
disadvantage for long-term goals. Additionally, if hardware failures were modeled 
probabilistically and their probability distributions were dependent on future hazards as 
well as institutional strategies, like was the case in the study about just water systems in 
Chapter 3, the future vulnerabilities from interdependencies and benefits from strategies 
could be assessed.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SYNTHESIS 
5.1 Summary 
This dissertation advances the capability of water infrastructure utilities to 
anticipate and adapt to vulnerabilities in their systems from temperature increases and 
interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. Impact assessment models of 
increased heat and interdependencies were developed which incorporate probability, 
spatial, temporal, and operational information. Key findings from the work are that with 
increased heat the increased probability of water quality non-compliances is the greatest 
amongst a selection of water quality indicators and component failures (chapter 2), the 
anticipated increases in probability of hardware failures components is the greatest for 
iron pipes, then pumps, and then PVC pipes (chapter 3), the effects of temperature 
increase on hardware components and on service losses are non-linear due to spatial 
criticality of components (chapter 3), and vulnerabilities from interdependencies are 
dependent on spatial and operational complexity (chapter 4). Exploring different 
parameters of the models allowed for comparison of institutional strategies.  Key findings 
are that either preventative maintenance or repair strategies can completely offset 
additional outages from increased temperatures (chapter 3), though improved repair times 
reduce overall duration of outages more than preventative maintenance (chapter 3), and 
that coordinated strategies across utilities could be effective for mitigating vulnerability 
(chapter 4).  
A comparison of results across the two chapters which model the impacts of 
temperature increase (chapters 2 and 3), reveal different outcomes for component failures 
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and service losses, highlighting the importance of including spatial and temporal 
information in assessment models. The inputs of cumulative realistic temperature 
exposures in chapter 3 show different magnitudes and relative increases in failures across 
components than was estimated in chapter 2 using inputs of scenarios of average 
temperature exposures. The reason for the difference is that exposure-failure CDFs 
characterize probability of failure using the average of the entire range of daily 
temperatures over a year. The temperature-failure CDFs are averaged from only a range 
of summertime temperatures. The wider range of temperatures decreases the magnitude 
of increase in probabilities across all hardware components. Additionally, the relative 
sensitivities of components to temperature change became more apparent with the wider 
range of temperature inputs in chapter 3.  The temperature-failure CDF curves developed 
in chapter 2 show that iron pipes have the greatest variance of curves for different 
temperatures, then pumps, then PVC pipes. This ended up characterizing the result given 
the full range of temperatures experienced in chapter 3. In chapter 2, under the limited 
range of temperatures the sensitivity of iron pipes to changes in temperature was not fully 
characterized. The ranking of the rest of the components in terms of their percent increase 
in failures remains the same as in chapter 2, however. Pumps have the second largest 
increase and then PVC pipes have the least increase. Additionally, the estimated increases 
in outages in chapter 3 is much fewer than those estimated in chapter 2 because chapter 2 
assumes a direct relationship between component failures and service losses, but due to 
the various component criticalities, chapter 3 discovers that the relationship is non-direct.    
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5.2 Application 
We suggest that water utilities incorporate the findings and insights from the 
dissertation into their decision-making processes when considering and preparing for 
impacts of additional heat and interdependencies. Anticipating the patterns of failure of 
their components and service losses can help generate effective institutional strategies 
regarding  design of operations and hardware. Findings and recommendations from the 
dissertation should also be considered along with other challenges utilities anticipate 
facing to develop a comprehensive plan for the future. We also hope to broadly inspire 
utilities to start using impact assessment models to explore future changes within their 
systems. 
The decision-making framework of water utilities may need to adapt to encourage 
anticipation and sensing of the increases in failures. The current budgeting structure has 
no formal process to incorporate future estimations of component reliability from either 
historical failure data or future climate models. According to the AWWA manual on 
utility management, budgets include the expenditures of the past year and the funds 
needed for new projects.185 Because only the expenditures of the past year are considered, 
utilities are not encouraged to identify increases in failures that may be occurring over 
time and that may occur in the future. Therefore, adaptations typically are made when 
utilities recognize that an extreme event occurred during the year and decide to fund a 
new project to update the system for that extreme.6 For  stressors like heat which cause 
accumulated degradation overtime, and not dramatic events with many failures at once, 
utilities are less prepared to sense the threat and adapt. This necessary change to their 
decision making process could either come from within individual utilities or from a 
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regulatory body.215 A program that could improve their ability to sense increased risk 
would be a conditions-based maintenance program, where utilities would monitor the 
temperature exposure to their hardware and water quality and plan maintenance based on 
the exposure values in addition to age.   
In addition to operations, anticipation of risk to components could better inform 
design of hardware. More accurate estimates of probability of failure could improve the 
cost-benefit analyses of the sizing, number, and type of materials of components. 
Regarding sizing and numbers, smaller components (for example, pumps) running in 
parallel are less expensive than larger pumps, however having more pumps creates more 
chance for failure. Alternatively, larger pumps may give more chance of failure through 
their dependency with the power system (as demonstrated in the example in Chapter 4). 
The better understanding of risk of failures from heat and interdependencies can therefore 
help utilities determine the right balance of size and numbers of components. 
Additionally, better anticipation of risk could inform the cost benefit analysis of the use 
of more robust materials. For example, the knowledge of increases in risk of motor 
failure could justify the spending of funds to improve their insulation classes which 
would decrease the probability of failure. 
Climate impacts to other infrastructure systems that depend upon network 
connections and operations of the flow of materials can also learn from this framework of 
modeling -- using specific mathematical formulations of degradation from the hazard, 
component operations, and the connections between components. We ultimately hope 
that using spatial and temporally explicit information becomes a more common practice 
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for anticipating and preparing for changing conditions which underlie successful 
provision of vital infrastructure services.  
 
5.3 Future Work 
There are many avenues for future work that would enhance the capacity of the 
models presented in this dissertation to facilitate decision making within water utilities. 
The characterization of institutional strategies could be improved in types, levels, and 
cost-effectiveness, and additional hazards and types of failures could be incorporated.  
More types and levels of institutional strategies could be modeled to improve the 
ability for utilities to use the model to compare and prioritize strategies. There are more 
types of design, planning, and operational actions available to utilities besides 
preventative maintenance, corrective repair, and real time operational response. For 
example, utilities could redesign the structure of the networks, add redundancies, or 
preventatively replace components. A model that includes all possible institutional 
actions would help utilities compare and prioritize actions for practical decision making. 
This would require consulting utility managers to learn all of the actions available and 
developing ways to model those actions. Additionally, in reality, strategies provide levels 
of failure mitigation potential according to how many resources are invested in them. For 
example, corrective maintenance could be modeled at different levels according to 
different types of component replacement options. Water utilities have to manage the 
trade-offs between cost and reliability of new equipment when choosing replacement 
components. They have the option to buy full new equipment which provide low 
probabilities of failure or to buy inexpensive parts to replace only the damaged 
 103 
components within the hardware which are associated with higher probabilities of 
failure.216 For example, when motors and electronics overheat, either the burnt windings 
of the motor or the entire motor could to be replaced.216 Including different options 
available to utilities for each of the strategies would expand the realistic decision-
variables within the models.  
The modeling efforts in this dissertation build towards the capability of utilities to 
do cost-benefit analyses of adaptation strategies to prioritize investments. Cost-
effectiveness would be a better metric than outage reduction effectiveness for decision-
making because it would help to compare outages on more realistic terms. For example, it 
is anticipated that though repair strategies are the most effective at reducing outages 
overall, a level of repair that costs the same amount as a level of preventative 
maintenance may not be more effective at reducing outages and therefore preventative 
maintenance would be a more attractive strategy. In order to allow for this comparison, 
costs of the strategies of repair and preventative maintenance and their ability to reduce 
outages at different levels of investment should be estimated. The social and economic 
costs of outages should also be estimated to fully characterize the cost of not preventing 
outages.  
The cost of repair is dependent on the labor required to do the repair and the cost 
of replacement parts. There are at least three different types of labor forces that can be 
involved in the repair of failed components: (1) by operations staff during normal 
operating hours; (2) by operations staff during overtime hours; or (3) by outside 
contractors.141,217 Throughout the year, water utilities may end up using a combination of 
these three approaches for repairs and replacements. When repairs or replacements are 
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done during normal hours, there is no extra cost to the utility in terms of man-hours. The 
overall cost of the labor time within a given time period could be estimated by 
multiplying the number of failures in a time period by the cost of the labor in that time 
period. The cost of the labor in the time period could be a weighted average of the 
different types of labor used by the utility with the weights being specific to each utility 
according to what percentage of the failures they use each type of labor. Furthermore, to 
estimate the cost of replacement of equipment after failure, the percentage of repairs 
where full replacements were used versus parts replacements should be considered. When 
estimating future costs, it would be a good idea to use a projection of the cost of labor 
and parts instead of the current costs.  
Estimating the cost-effectiveness of different levels of preventative maintenance 
would require characterizing the non-direct relationship between investment levels and 
improvements to reliability. Investments into preventative maintenance improve 
reliability of components up to a point, but after all parts are functioning good-as-new, 
the phenomenon of diminishing marginal returns occurs where an additional unit of 
investment (e.g. installing a new part) generates much less improvement in reliability. 
The marginal return of the investment depends on the accuracy of reliability predictions. 
As utilities are better able to understand and predict the state of reliability of their 
components, they are better able to avoid wasteful investments and strategically invest in 
needy components. Therefore, as accuracy of prediction improves, there is more marginal 
return of investment. In order to calculate what the marginal return is for different levels 
of accuracy, a statistical regression could be generated using the following utility data for 
different components: their predictions of component failure times and the actual 
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component failure times -- the difference of which characterizes accuracy, and the 
amount invested in each component for preventative maintenance, along with the 
resulting reliability of the components. 
The social and economic impacts resulting from the service outages should also be 
estimated and included in a future cost-benefit analysis. This would provide an 
understanding of the true costs of outages and could help utilities prioritize adaption 
strategies in different neighborhoods. There are different social and economic impacts in 
different neighborhoods of the distribution system based on the critical need of resources 
at those locations.218 Therefore, weights could be assigned to each demand node in the 
network model and the outages which occur at the demand nodes could be weighted in 
order to calculate an overall impact. The component failures and institutional strategies 
that caused the most impact could be then prioritized for improvement.  
In addition to realistically modeling strategies and their costs, there are additional 
elements that could be added to the models to improve their capacity to facilitate 
decision-making. Other climate and future hazards and components could be 
incorporated into the model in chapter 3. Temperature effects could be modeled in 
coincidence with other hazards which utilities are facing in semi-arid regions. One hazard 
that could be modeled simultaneously would be wildfires sparked from the increased 
temperature, which would decrease the quality of the incoming water into the water 
treatment plants. Additional dynamics could be added to the model in chapter 3 to 
incorporate the interactions between the difference hazards. For example, it could help 
answer the question: what happens when there are water quality problems and increased 
hardware failure at the same time? A survey of water utilities shows that  “several 
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utilities have experienced dual extreme events with different outcomes – for example 
drought and flooding. These events can result in different impacts to assets and 
infrastructure and certainly make it more challenging for utilities to plan for the future”.6 
Therefore, there is a need for exploration of the impacts of multiple hazards. 
Additionally, while water quality effects were modeled in chapter 2, they could also be 
incorporated into the network model in chapter 3 through the water quality modeling 
function of EPANET. This would allow for the estimation of the spatially-explicit 
impacts of water quality degradation. For example, it could help answer the question: 
which demand nodes within the network are most susceptible to water quality issues from 
increasing temperatures? It would also support the exploration of the interactions 
between water quality problems and hardware failures.  
 
5.4 Adaptation Framework Landscape 
This dissertation is part of a large and methodologically diverse effort to expand 
the decision-making metrics and frameworks which utilities use to adapt infrastructure to 
future conditions. ASCE states that “engineers should develop a new paradigm for 
engineering practice in a world in which climate is changing, but cannot be projected 
with a high degree of certainty”.2 This will require multiple different adaptation 
frameworks for different levels of uncertainty. “When it is not possible to fully define 
and estimate the risks and potential costs of a project and reduce the uncertainty in the 
timeframe in which action should be taken, engineers should use low-regret, adaptive 
strategies… to make the project more resilient to future climate and weather extremes. 
Engineers should seek alternatives that do well across a range of possible future 
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conditions”.2 The work of this dissertation modeling impacts therefore is an approach that 
is useful given the bounded uncertainty of climate models, but it is not sufficient for 
helping to prepare for future hazards that are not so well projected. Resilience and safe-
to-fail are better overall decision-making frameworks to operate under for these 
conditions. However, the models presented in this dissertation can inform parts of these 
efforts.  
Resilience frameworks focus on improving a utility’s “ability to adapt to changing 
conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption”.219  “This 
process can be modeled as a cycle encompassing at least four components that are often 
missing from the use phase of many engineering projects: (1) sensing, (2) anticipation, 
(3) adaptation, and (4) learning”.128 Modeling helps anticipate impacts in possible futures 
and preventatively adapt. Adaptation can also come from many different types of 
information, however.128,220,221 “Adaptation can be either autonomous (e.g. reducing 
physical activity during a heatwave) or purposefully planned (e.g. adopting new building 
codes). Planned adaptation can be either reactive (i.e. after some impacts have been 
experienced) or proactive/ anticipatory (i.e. before major damage has occurred)”.222 
Resilience can also mean adapting institutional and organizational structures when 
necessary to meet the entities truly important objectives.189 
 The safe-to-fail framework suggests that infrastructure managers should assume 
components will fail for some reason or another and that they should prioritize 
minimizing failure of delivery of critical services to society that can occur from those 
failures.223 Therefore, estimating frequency of component failures is not a useful 
modeling exercise under this framework. The modeling of interdependencies, as was 
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done in chapter 4, could be useful, however. Since infrastructure systems are 
interdependent, there are all involved in providing the critical services. Therefore, utilities 
could use operational models of interdependency propagation to identify which pathways 
of vulnerability propagation between infrastructures threaten the provision of critical 
services and thus which pathways of failure they should minimize through institutional 
strategies.    
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 2 
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A.1 Overall methodology process flow 
The sequential steps of the risk projection and suggestion of prioritization of operational 
strategies is shown in Figure 26.  
 
 
Figure 26 Methodology Process Flow 
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A.2 Identifying Temperature-Related Sensitivity and Exposure 
A literature review was conducted to identify which infrastructure components within 
water treatment and distribution systems are sensitive to temperatures. These 
components, including their mechanisms of temperature-sensitivity, are shown in Table 
2.  
 
Table 2 Temperature Sensitive Components Identified through Literature Review 
 
Infrastructure 
Component 
 
Temperature-
Sensitivity 
Type of Temperature 
Stress over summertime 
period 
 
Source(s) 
Motor Overheating Ambient temperature 
surrounding motor  
10–12,82 
Electronics Overheating Ambient temperature 
surrounding electrical 
cabinet 
83,84 
Plastic pipe Degradation Water temperature  16 
Metal pipe Corrosion Water temperature  17 
Pipe Fracture from soil 
expansion 
Soil temperature 129 
Water quality Chlorine residual 
decay 
Water temperature 32 
Water quality Total trihalomethane 
(TTHM) growth 
Water temperature 33 
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Water quality Trihaloactic acid 
(THAA) growth 
Water temperature 34 
Water quality Legionella growth Water temperature 35,36 
Water quality Mycobacterium 
avium complex 
(MAC) growth 
Water temperature 37,38 
Water quality Nitrification increase Water temperature 39–41,133 
Water 
demand 
Increase Ambient air temperature 25 
Operators Heat fatigue Ambient air temperature 132 
 
The degradation rate of the motors and electronics is theoretically related to the 
cumulative difference between the operating temperature (ambient temperature plus 
temperature from dissipated heat) and the design temperature during the summer. The 
studies of other environmental and public health hazards have found that the impact of a 
hazard depends on “the concentration, amount or intensity of a particular agent that 
reaches a target system in terms of its duration, frequency, and intensity”.136 It is 
therefore assumed that physical components experiencing degradation would have 
varying levels of degradation for different durations of exposure along with magnitudes 
of temperature exposure. A proposed equation for the rate of component degradation of 
motors and electronics over a time for period as a function of exposure temperature, has 
been formulated as shown in Equations 3 – 5.  
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𝑟+ = ` α ∙ maxi0,𝑇(𝑡)kb 𝑑𝑡JcJE (3) 𝑇(𝑡) = 𝑇l(𝑡) − 𝑇+ (4) 𝑇l	(𝑡) = 𝑇m(𝑡) + 𝑇n(𝑡) (5) 
 
rd is rate of degradation [lifespan/oC], T is the ambient of temperature of exposure [oC], 𝛼 
and ß are the linear and exponential parameters of degradation, TO is the operating 
temperature of the component [oC], Td is the designed maximum allowable temperature 
of a component [oC], Ta is the ambient temperature [oC], and Th is the change in 
temperature surrounding the component as a result of the heat dissipation from friction of 
operation [oC]. The temperature from dissipated heat, Th, is modeled as an average range, 
and the ambient temperature is assumed to be Ta,max, the 3-month average of maximum 
daily ambient temperatures. Th is 105- 115 oC for motors and 5.5-55.5 oC for electronics 
as described in SI Table S6. To and consequentially are rd averages as well. The 
modifications to the degradation rate made for the purposes of modeling are shown in 
Equations 6 - 8. The bounds of integration are defined as the summertime period, t1 = 
June 1st and t2 = August 31st. 𝑟+ = α ∙ maxi0, 𝑇kb (6) 𝑇 = 𝑇l − 𝑇+ (7) 𝑇l	 = 𝑇m,pmq + 𝑇n (8) 
 
Similarly, little is known about how long it takes for chemical reactions to change given a 
change in water temperature.  
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A.3 Urban Water System Case Study 
The potable water distribution and treatment systems within the overall water system 
were chosen for the analysis as highlighted in Figure 27. The temperature projections for 
Phoenix, Arizona and Las Vegas, Nevada from global climate models are shown in 
Figure 28.  
 
 
Figure 27 Urban Water Infrastructure Systems. The potable water treatment and 
distribution infrastructure systems (bolded text) are analyzed because the failure of 
components could most logically be linked to the failure of municipal residents not 
receiving sufficient amounts and quality of water. 
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Figure 28 Average of Maximum Daily Summer Air Temperature (3x3) Projections 
from Global Climate Models for Phoenix, Arizona and Las Vegas, Nevada. Air 
temperatures in Phoenix and Las Vegas are projected to significantly increase by 2050 in 
all RCP scenarios. 
 
A potable water treatment and distribution system with representative Phoenix and Las 
Vegas characteristics was selected for the analysis. Characteristics of the Phoenix and 
Las Vegas are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 Potable Water Treatment and Distribution System Characteristic 
Comparison in Phoenix, Arizona and Las Vegas, Nevada. 
 
Characteristic 
City of Phoenix, 
Arizona 
Las Vegas Water 
District, Nevada 
 
Source 
Projected temperature 
range from 2020 - 
2050 
39.9 – 43.7oC 35.9 – 40.5oC 121 
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Projected temperature 
increase from 2020 - 
2050 
0.4 – 1.7oC  0.6 – 2.0oC  121 
Treatment Capacity 
(MGD) 
700 MGD 900 MGD 155,157 
Number of pumping 
stations in distribution 
system 
110 100 140,224  
Miles of pipe in whole 
system 
7,000 7,000 140,224 
Number of WTPs  6 2 157,225 
Number of Quality 
Sampling Stations 
70 No record 226,227 
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In many ways, the Phoenix and Las Vegas water infrastructure are similar, thus a water 
system with combined characteristics between the two places was modeled. The number 
of components in the combined system is shown in Table 4. The redundancies of 
components modeled are shown in Table 5. The number of opportunities for water 
outages are shown in Table 6, and the modeled operating characteristics are shown in 
Table 7. Inputs into the model listed in Tables S3-S6 represent scenarios. Some of the 
scenarios are representative of Phoenix/Las Vegas specifically, some are generic to all 
modern water infrastructure systems, and some are reasonable scenarios based on 
engineering judgement as guided by textbooks and interviews with utility engineers.  The 
scenario type was chosen based on the amount of data available. All scenarios were 
specific to Phoenix and Las Vegas where possible.  
 
Table 4 Case Study Water System Components 
 
Modeled Component 
Phoenix 
and Las 
Vegas – 
type 
system 
 
Type of 
Scenario 
 
 
Explanation of Scenario 
Total number of 
pumping stations in 
overall water system 
100  
specific 
Data from Las Vegas and 
Phoenix city documents and 
conversations with engineers. 
140,224 
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Number of WTPs 4 specific Data found from Las Vegas and 
Phoenix city documents.157,225 
Number of pumping 
stations in each WTP 
2 reasonable The situation for pumping units is 
applied to pumping stations. 183 
Number of pumping 
units per pumping 
station 
2 (1 
standby) 
reasonable This is stated as a minimal case 
for most water systems. This 
series system behavior allows for 
propagation of failure rates. 183 
Number of motors 
per pumping unit 
1 reasonable Motor is referred to singularly as 
housed in a pump casing.12 
Number of electronic 
controls per pumping 
unit 
1 reasonable Controls are needed to operate 
each motor. 183 
Treatment Capacity 
(MGD) 
800 realistic Average value between Las 
Vegas and Phoenix. 140,224 
Miles of pipe in WDS 7,000 reasonable Data from Las Vegas and 
Phoenix city documents and 
engineers. 140,224 
Miles of pipe in WTP 540 reasonable A pipe manufacturer’s website 
disclosed how many miles of pipe 
were used in an expansion of a 
water treatment plant for a certain 
number of counties.228 The 
 140 
counties per MGD fraction for 
that water utility229 was used to 
translate the mileage to a Las 
Vegas and Phoenix type system.  
Percentage PVC 
pipes in WDS 
30% 
 
realistic This is the average percentage 
reported for AZ, NM, TX, OK, 
AR, & LA.230 
Percentage cast iron 
pipe in WDS 
20% 
 
realistic This is the average percentage 
reported for AZ, NM, TX, OK, 
AR, & LA.230 
Percentage PVC 
pipes in WTP 
0% reasonable “PVC is only used for low 
pressure applications and 
transportation of coarse solids” in 
WTPs.231 
Percentage cast iron 
pipe in WTP 
100% reasonable “Metal is one of the principle 
materials” used for piping in 
WTPs. 231 
Sampling Stations 70 specific Data found from City of Phoenix 
non-compliance reporting 
website. 226 
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Redundancies prevent component failures from cascading to system failures 125. Table 5 
shows the number of redundancies of various processes within the system that are 
available when other components fail. The number of components and amounts of 
backup resources in Table 5 are inputs to estimating systemic failures. These values are 
scenarios either pulled from examples from an engineering text, or are from discussions 
with water treatment and distribution engineers.  
 
Table 5 Redundancy Scenarios 
 
Characteristic 
Number 
for 
modeled 
scenario 
 
Type of 
Scenario 
 
Explanation of Scenario 
Number of pumping 
units needed to be in 
operation for 
pumping station to 
deliver water 
2 reasonable This is stated as the typical case 
for most water systems. 183 
Number of WTPs 
that can supply a 
pressure zone 
2 reasonable City of Tempe engineer told 
authors a story of how a 
lightning storm caused the two 
WTPs in the city to fail which 
caused a pressure decrease in a 
pressure zone.  232  
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Number of WTPs 
needed to be 
operational for all 
water to be delivered 
2 reasonable City of Tempe engineer told 
authors a story of how a 
lightning storm caused the two 
WTPs in the city to fail which 
caused a pressure decrease in a 
pressure zone. When only one 
WTP was down, the pressure 
was adequate.  232 
Amount of emergency 
storage of treated 
water at WTP 
Insufficient 
Amount 
 
reasonable 
Depending on the outage time of 
components, the backup storage 
water could eventually become 
insufficient. 194 
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Table 6 shows the annual systemic failure opportunities by process. These are the count 
of possible events where if components failed, they would cause some level of outage in 
a water distribution pressure zone (PZ). The values are estimated from the number of 
components in the system in Table 4. All scenarios are “reasonable” because predicting 
whether or not a pressure zone is more accurately dependent upon relational spatial and 
temporal information about components and demands.125 
 
Table 6 Number of Modeled Opportunities for Systemic Failures. 
 
Type of Systemic 
Failure 
Phoenix and 
Las Vegas – 
type system 
value 
 
Type of 
Scenario 
 
Explanation 
of Scenarios 
Pressure zone (PZ) 
from pumping station 
(PS) outage in WDS 
82 reasonable same as 
pumping 
stations 
Pressure zone from PS 
outage in WTP 
6 reasonable same as 
number of 
WTPs 
Pressure Zone from 
any PS outage 
88 reasonable PZ from PS 
outage in 
WDS + PZ 
from PS 
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outage in 
WTP 
Pressure zone from 
WTP pipe break 
540 reasonable miles of pipe 
in WTP that 
are cast iron 
or PVC 
Pressure zone from 
WDS pipe break 
3,500 reasonable miles of pipe 
that are cast 
iron or PVC 
Pressure zone failure 
opportunities from any 
pipe break 
4,040 reasonable Miles of 
pipe in WDS 
and WTP 
that are cast 
iron or PVC 
Pressure zone outage 
from chlorine residual 
decay below threshold 
70 reasonable Number of 
sampling 
stations 
Pressure zone outage 
from TTHM above 
threshold 
70 reasonable Number of 
sampling 
stations 
Pressure zone outage 
from water quality 
non-compliance 
70 reasonable Number of 
sampling 
stations 
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Operating characteristics are shown in Table 7. The values were possible ranges or means 
found from literature. The ranges of operating characteristics are used as parameters in 
the failure metric equations used to create probability distributions that characterize 
physical component failure or water quality non-compliance. 
 
Table 7 Modeled Operating Characteristics  
Operating 
Characteristic 
Distributio
n 
Parameters 
Assumed 
Distributio
n type 
Type of 
Scenario 
Explanation of Scenario  
Water temp. 
regression 
coefficient  
range: 0.52 
– 0.89 
Uniform generic From empirical data from 9 
Japanese WTPs.142 
Water temp. 
regression 
constant (oC 
water/ oC air) 
mean: 
3.8113, 
std. dev.: 
1.890 
Normal  generic From empirical data from 9 
Japanese WTPs.142 
Age of PVC 
pipes (yr) 
min: 20, 
max: 80 
Points generic From US and Canadian 
empirical data.230 
Age of Iron 
pipes (yr) 
min: 30, 
max: 70  
Normal generic From US and Canadian 
empirical data.230 
Pipe diameter 
(in) 
range: 12-
24 
Uniform generic Range reported in text 
book.7 
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Pipe thickness 
(mm) 
min: mean: 
9.4615, 
std. dev.: 
1.5875, 
max: 
mean: 
12.6365, 
std. dev.: 
1.5875 
Lognormal generic Range from a pipe 
manufacturer.233 
Insulation 
Class of 
Motors 
F Point specific Class of insulation used in 
hot climates234 
Maximum 
rated motor 
temperature 
(oC)  
155  Point specific Maximum rated temperature 
for class F insulation 11 
Temperature 
rise of motor 
(dependent 
upon use) (oC) 
range: 105-
115 
Uniform specific Possible temperature rise 
range for class F insulation11 
Age of Motor 
(years) 
min: 5  
max: 10 
Points reasonab
le 
Low and high points 
equidistant from MTTF  
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Temperature 
rise in 
electronic 
cabinets (oC) 
range: 5.5-
55.5 
Uniform generic Range reported for 
unfinished aluminum and 
stainless steel, and painted 
metallic and non-metallic 
enclosures with an 2-16 
W/ft2 input power83 
Electronic 
Cabinet % 
temperature 
reduction from 
shielding 
range: 25% 
- 46% 
Uniform reasonab
le 
This is the range reported, 
assuming there is some 
amount of shielding83 
Electronic 
cabinet % 
temperature 
reduction from 
circulating 
fans 
10% Point reasonab
le 
Assumption that even in 
worst case conditions, there 
is still a circulating fan. 83 
Electronic 
cabinet % 
temperature 
reduction from 
air 
50% - 
100% 
Uniform reasonab
le 
Reasonable considering it is 
reported that AC can reduce 
temperature by up to 30oC83 
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conditioning 
(AC) 
Age of 
electronic 
component 
(years) 
min: 7 
max: 12 
Points reasonab
le 
 Low and high points 
equidistant from MTTF 
Water age (h) range: 32-
72 
Uniform generic Range found in EPA 
report.235  
Specific UV 
absorbance 
(SUVA) 
(l/mg*m) 
range: 
1.04-1.21 
Uniform generic Empirical range from journal 
article.236 
TOC (mg/L) range: 1.3 -
5.6 
Uniform generic Range from white paper on 
water quality.237 
pH range: 6.5-
8.5 
Uniform specific Reported range from city 
water quality reports152 
Initial chlorine 
concentration 
(mg/L) 
range: 0.4-
3 
Uniform generic Reported range from white 
paper on water treatment.238 
Bromide 
concentration 
(mg/L) 
range: 0-
0.5 
Uniform 
 
 
generic Reported range from EPA 
report.239 
 149 
MTTFT1 of 
Pipes (yr) 
scale 
(characteri
stic life): 
47, shape: 
2 
Weibull reasonab
le 
The mean of 47 is reported. 
The shape parameter is 
chosen to be greater than 
one. 125,230 
MTTFT1 of 
Motor (yr) 
scale 
(characteri
stic life): 
7.5, shape: 
2 
Weibull reasonab
le 
The mean of 7.5 is reported. 
The shape parameter is 
chosen to be greater than 
one. 125 
MTTFT1 of 
Electronics 
(yr) 
scale 
(characteri
stic life): 
9.5, shape: 
2 
Weibull reasonab
le 
The mean of 9.5 is reported. 
The shape parameter is 
chosen to be greater than 
one. 125 
 
A.4 Modeling increases in component and water quality failure 
A.4.1 Failure Metric Calculation 
The equations used for each component are described in the following subsections.  
A.4.1.1 Motor Degradation 
An increase in ambient temperature poses a threat of overheating to the operation of 
motors and electronics that are vital to the operation of the pumping units. Motors can 
overheat from the combined dissipated heat from motor windings and the ambient 
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temperature surrounding the motor, causing destruction of the insulation which can lead 
to burnt stator windings 10–12,82. For every 10°C increase in the operating temperature 
over the capacity of the insulation, the lifespan decreases by one-half 10–12,82. The lifespan 
from this relationship was assumed to be the ETTF. All equations used for calculating 
motor ETTF are shown in Equations 9 - 11.  𝑟+ = 0.5	 (9) 
 𝑟+ = 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛	𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑝𝑒𝑟	10℃	𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹 = lifespan or mean-time-to-failure of component 
 
To calculate new ETTFs with temperature change, the following exponential decay 
model was created from the degradation rate information.  𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹$z = 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹$% ∗ (1 − 𝑟+)$ %.⁄ (10) 
 
Where  𝑇 = |𝑇m,pmq}}}}}}}} + 𝑇n}}}~ − 𝑇+ (11) 𝑇+ = 155°𝐶 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹$% = 𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹	𝑎𝑡	𝑎𝑛	𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹$z = 𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹	𝑎𝑡	𝑎	𝑛𝑒𝑤	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑇 = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑖𝑛	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦	[℃] 𝑇	n= 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡	𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑓	𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠	[℃] 𝑇m,pmq = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑟	𝑑𝑢𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠	[℃] 𝑇+ = max 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝑜𝑛		𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠	𝐹	𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦		[°𝐶] 
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A.4.1.2 Electronic ETTF Degradation 
Similar to motors, the electronic controls that are used for pump operation are typically 
stored in electrical cabinets, and for every 10°C rise in enclosure temperature above 
40oC, the lifespan of the electronics decreases by one-half 83,84. The enclosure 
temperature is the combination of dissipated heat from the electric load inside the 
enclosure and the outside ambient temperature minus the temperature reduction from 
cooling devices. The equation used for calculating the electronic’s ETTF are shown in 
Equation 12.  𝑇 = |𝑇m,pmq}}}}}}}} + 𝑅𝑇n}}}~ − 𝑇+																																																				(12) 𝑇+ = 40°𝐶 𝑇n = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒	𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡	𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐	𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑	[℃] 𝑇m,pmq = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒	𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑑𝑢𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒[℃] 𝑇 = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒	𝑖𝑛	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒	𝑡ℎ𝑒	𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑	[℃] 𝑅 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑓𝑎𝑛𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐴𝐶	[%] 
 
A.4.1.3 PVC Pipe ETTF Degradation 
With high water temperatures, thermoplastic pipes can experience overbearing 
pressures, and PVC experiences the greatest degradation of all types of thermoplastic 
pipes 16. The derating of the pipe is linear with increasing water temperatures. The Rate 
of Lifespan degradation for every 1o C above insulation exceedance threshold is shown in 
Table 8. 16 The Plastics Industry Pipes Association of Australia Limited states that linear 
interpolation can be used to estimate derating factors in between the temperatures listed. 
Thus, a linear regression is applied to the data points to estimate derating for the different 
temperature scenarios.  
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Table 8 PVC Pressure Derating Factors 16 
Temperature (ºC) Pressure Derating 
Factor 
20 1 
30 0.87 
40 0.7 
50 0.58 
 
The linear equation for derating factor obtained from these data is: 𝐷 = −0.0123𝑇3 + 1.293 (13) 𝐷 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒	𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑇3 = 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	(°𝐶) 
We assume that pressure degradation is not corrected in operations so that it directly correlates 
with lifespan degradation: 𝑟+ = 𝐷 (14) 
 𝑟+ = 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛	𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑝𝑒𝑟	°𝐶	𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒  
ETTF decay model: 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹$z = 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹$% ∗ 𝑟+ (15) 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹$z = 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹$% ∗ (−0.0123𝑇3 + 1.293) (16) 
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A.4.1.4 Iron Pipe ETTF Corrosion 
For iron pipes, the temperature-related mechanism of failure is internal corrosion17. 
The relationship between corrosion rate and temperature has been reported in the 
literature for only the cast iron type of pipe. Temperature may have a similar effect on the 
corrosion rate of ductile iron and steel pipes though no relationship was found in 
literature. Corrosion rates for cast iron pipes are reported to be empirically different for 
water treatment plants (WTPs) and the water distribution system (WDS) (Equations 17 & 
18). External and internal pit corrosion are relative to the original pipe thickness and were 
calculated from empirical corrosion rates where external pit depth was assumed to be 
one-half of the internal pit depth17.  Corrosion rates and pipe age were used to calculate 
pit depth. The average age of pipes in the Southwest US is about 50 years230.The pit 
depth was then used to calculate the remaining life of the pipe according to Randall-
Smith et al.144 Then the ETTF was assumed to be the current age of the pipe plus its 
remaining life as shown in the Equations 19-25.  
 
External and internal pit corrosion were relative to the original pipe thickness and were 
calculated with empirical corrosion rates 17.  
 
For iron pipes in a water distribution system: 𝑟 = 0.0272 ∗ 𝑇3 + 0.0915 (17) 
For iron pipes in a water treatment plant: 𝑟 = 0.0774 ∗ 𝑇3 − 0.1073 (18) 
Corrosion rates and pipe age were used to calculate the internal pit depth: 𝑃; = 𝑟 ∗ 𝑡 (19) 
It was assumed that the external pit depth, Pe, would be half of the internal pit depth due 
to lack of information.  
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𝑃A = 0.5𝑃; (20) 𝑃A = 0.5𝑡(0.0774 ∗ 𝑇3 − 0.1073) (21) 
 
 
The pit depth is the depth of the hole that appears in the pipe from the corrosion. The size 
of the hole determines how much life is left in the pipe 144.  
 𝜌 =  𝑡𝑃A + 𝑃; 𝛿 − 𝑡 (22) 
 𝜌 = 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒	[𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠]	 𝑡 = 𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛	[𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠] 𝛿 = 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒	𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙	[𝑖𝑛. ] 𝑃; = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑝𝑖𝑡	𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ	[𝑖𝑛. ] 𝑃A = 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑝𝑖𝑡	𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ	[𝑖𝑛. ] 
 
Remaining life (in time) equation including values of external and internal pit corrosion 
was translated into mean time to failure calculation using the assumption that ETTF 
equaled the sum of current age of the pipe and the remaining life of the pipe.  𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹 = 𝑡 + 𝜌 (23) 
 𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹 = 𝑡𝑃A + 𝑃; 𝛿 (24) 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹 = 𝑡0.5𝑡(0.0774 ∗ 𝑇3 − 0.1073) + 𝑃; 𝛿 (25) 
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A.4.1.5 TTHM Formation 
Water quality is also affected by an increase in water temperature. The water temperature 
change increases the rates of production of cancerous chemical compounds. Total 
Trihalomethanes (TTHMs) are disinfection byproducts formed from organic reactions 
with chlorine and can cause cancer in consumers.240 Temperature is one of the factors 
influencing TTHM formation because temperature increases the reaction rates between 
the organics and disinfectants (Equation 26).33 Equation 26 was generated from empirical 
data from within the water distribution system of Istanbul City, Turkey which is supplied 
by surface water and goes through the following treatment steps: “aeration, 
prechlorination, coagulation, flocculation-sedimentation, filtration, and postchlorination.” 
The parameters of the THM formation distribution were used to calculate the cumulative 
probability that a concentration from the distribution would be above the EPA regulated 
threshold of 80 µg/L for THMs.148 
 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝑀 = 11.967 ∗ (𝑇𝑂𝐶).. ∗ 𝑇3..%@ ∗ 𝐶𝑙z...z (26) 𝑇𝑂𝐶 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑐	𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛	 𝑚𝑔𝐿  𝐶𝑙z = 𝐶ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒	𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒	 𝑚𝑔𝐿  𝑇3 = 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	[℃] 
 
A.4.1.6 THAA Formation 
Total Haloacetic Acids (THAAs) are another temperature-sensitive disinfection 
byproduct and carcinogen. The concentration of THAAs is dependent upon the 
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concentration of TTHMs and temperature  where temperature was represented by the 
seasonality factor (Equation 27).34 Equation 27 was generated from an empirical study of 
three drinking water systems in the United Kingdom which represent a range of source 
water conditions – “upland surface water, a lowland surface water, and groundwater” 
with standard treatment mechanisms: aeration, filtration, coagulation, sedimentation, and 
chlorination.  
 𝑇𝐻𝐴𝐴	 = 	0.99	(𝑇𝑇𝐻𝑀).. ∗ 	 	(𝐶𝑙)..%@ ∗ 	 	(𝑆𝑈𝑉𝐴)... ∗		(𝐵𝑟? 		+ 	0.005)?..%z ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑇	 + 	5)... ∗ (𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛) (27) 
 
THAA = Total haloacetic acid [µ g/l] 
TTHM = Total trihalomethanes [µ g/l] 
Cl = Total chlorine [mg/l] 
SUVA = Specific UV absorbance [l/mg.m] 
Br = Bromide [mg/l] 
ResT = Water age (residence time) [h] 
Season = Season, expressed numerically as: 1 for spring, 1.46 for summer, 1.31 for 
autumn, 1.01 for winter 
 
A.4.1.7 Chlorine residual concentration 
Another type of quality concern is that of chlorine residual decay as water travels to the 
consumer. “The residual disinfectant concentration in the distribution system, measured 
as total chlorine, combined chlorine, or chlorine dioxide, as specified in § 141.74 (a)(2) 
and (b)(6), cannot be undetectable in more than 5 percent of the samples each month, for 
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any two consecutive months that the system serves water to the public”.149 An average 
detectable limit found from reviewing details of monitoring equipment is 0.0175 
mg/L.241,242   
The decay constant’s relationship with temperature was taken from the empirical study of 
two water distribution systems in Birmingham, Alabama, by Hua et al. 32 (Equation 28). 
Water quality non-compliance counts are for individual sampling stations. This study 
shows the counts of non-compliant stations. This could lead to an increased likelihood in 
2 months being non-compliant in a row.  
 
𝑘 = 0.0050𝑒...%$G𝐶 (28) 
 
 𝑘 = 𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒	𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑇3 = 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒	[℃] 𝐶. = 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	[𝑚𝑔𝐿 ] 
 
The concentration of remaining chlorine residual was calculated using Equation 29 & 
30.32 
 𝐶 = 𝐶𝑒?J (29) 
 
𝐶 = 𝐶𝑒?....@.AB.BCDEFGHI J (30) 
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 𝐶 = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑐ℎ𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	[𝑚𝑔𝐿 ] 𝑡 = 𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟	[ℎ𝑟]	 
 
A.4.2 Probability Distribution Creation Method 
The outputs were used to characterize the distributions by performing 5,000 iterations of 
Monte Carlo simulations on the degradation equations and sampling from the lower and 
upper halves of the ranges of operational characteristics, representing best case (lowest 
consequential probability of failure) and worst case (highest consequential probability of 
failure) of normal operating conditions (Table 9 & 10 respectively). Palisade© @Risk 
software was used to fit the output data from the simulations into probability distributions 
using the Anderson Darling (AD) Statistics, probability plots, visualization and 
judgement about the process underlying the data.145 Figures 29-45 show fit comparisons 
for all components and water quality aspects under worst-case operating conditions and 
40oC temperature scenario (although any other scenario would show similar results for all 
components and aspects of water quality except for chlorine residual—for which we 
show both scenarios). Figures show possible fits listed in order of AD Statistics and 
probability plots with fits listed in order of AIC rankings. For physical components, the 
Weibull distribution was chosen because it is typically used to characterize the general 
forms of degradation components experience with age, and it also had reasonable fits in 
terms of AD statistic and linear probability plots as shown in figures 29-36.146,243 
Parameters of the distributions and AD Statistics for one Monte Carlo simulation are 
shown in Table 9 and 10 (values vary slightly for every run of the simulation--due to 
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random nature of sampling in Monte Carlo). Generally, the better the distribution fits the 
data, the smaller the AD Statistic is. Table S10 shows the critical AD Statistics from the 
theoretical Weibull distribution for comparison with the AD statistics for the components 
fitted with Weibull to help evaluate the reasonableness of fit.244 When the AD Statistic 
from the fit is less than the critical statistic, the null hypothesis that the data fit a Weibull 
distribution is not rejected.245 Motors and PVC pipes were the only components that had 
outputs that were statistically equal to the Weibull to the 10% significance level. The 
physical components with non-statistical Weibull fits have other poor fits shown on the 
figures as a point of comparison with Weibull.  The output distributions for chlorine 
residual concentration were fitted as exponential distributions based on best fit and the 
need to be consistent across operating scenarios as shown in Figures 37-41. The 
exponential distribution was visually the best fit for the output for the worst-case 
operating conditions scenario, though the AD statistics suggested the gamma distribution 
was the better fit. Additionally, though the type of distribution of inputs were constant, 
the output of chlorine residual was so sensitive to the different ranges of inputs for 
different operating scenarios that it changed the output shape of the output. The worst-
case scenario could only fit an exponential whereas the best-case scenario looked much 
more of a bell shape characteristic of a normal or Weibull distribution. Exponential fits 
were used for both scenarios, however, so that the difference in probability of failure 
between scenarios would not be characterized by the difference in fitted distributions but 
rather only the increase in temperature. The exponential distribution was the only 
distribution that was in common between scenarios, so it was the one that was used. The 
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fits for DBP production were selected based on best fit as shown in figures 42-45. The 
best statistical fits for both TTHM and THAA was the Gamma distribution. 
 
Table 9 Output Distribution Parameters and Anderson-Darling Statistic of Failure 
Metrics from Monte Carlo Simulation for Low Failure Probability (Best-case 
Operational Characteristics). 
Compon
ent/ 
Chemical 
Distributi
on Type 
Distrib
ution  
Parame
ter 
Type 
Ambient Temperature Scenario (oC) 
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
Motors Weibull 
scale 18.9 17.4 16.1 14.9 13.7 12.7 11.7 10.8 10.0 
shape 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
AD 
statistic 
0.84 
Electroni
cs 
Weibull 
scale 22.3 20.9 19.3 18.1 16.9 15.8 14.7 13.8 12.8 
shape 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
AD 
statistic 
8.50 
PVC 
pipe 
Weibull 
scale 45.8 45.5 45.1 44.8 44.4 44.1 43.7 43.3 43.0 
shape 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
AD 
statistic 
0.07 
Iron Pipe 
in WDS 
Weibull 
scale 447 438 429 420 412 405 397 389 383 
shape 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.5 
AD 
statistic 
-- 
Iron Pipe 
in WTP 
Weibull 
scale 190 185 180 177 173 169  165 162 158 
shape 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.1 
AD 
statistic 
60.35 
Chlorine 
Residual  
Exponentia
l 
failure 
rate 
1.69 1.64 1.59 1.53 1.48 1.43 1.37 1.32 1.26 
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AD 
statistic 
920.53 
THM 
producti
on 
Gamma 
scale 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 
shape 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.7 
AD 
statistic 
39.76 
THAA 
producti
on 
Gamma 
scale 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 14.1 13.8 14.0 13.7 14.0 
shape 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 
AD 
statistic  
9.34 
 
Table 10 Output Distribution Parameters and Anderson-Darling Statistic of Failure 
Metrics from Monte Carlo Simulation for High Failure Probability (Worst-case 
Operational Characteristics) 
Component/ 
Chemical 
Distribution 
Type 
Distribution  
Parameter 
Type 
Ambient Temperature Scenario (oC) 
36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
Motors Weibull 
scale 12.7 11.7 10.7 10.0 9.2 8.5 7.9 7.3 6.8 
shape 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
AD statistic 0.45 
Electronics Weibull 
scale 13.5 12.6 11.8 11.0 10.2 9.5 8.9 8.3 7.7 
shape 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
AD statistic 4.15 
PVC pipe Weibull 
scale 42 41.5 41.0 40.6 40.1 40.0 39.2 38.7 38.3 
shape 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
AD statistic 0.08 
Iron Pipe in 
WDS 
Weibull 
scale 275 269 263 257 252 247 242 237 233 
shape 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 
AD statistic 2.29 
Iron Pipe in 
WTP 
Weibull 
scale 112 109 107 104 102 99 97 95 93 
shape 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.4 
AD statistic 65.0 
Exponential failure rate 0.077 0.067 0.057 0.047 0.039 0.033 0.022 0.018 0.014 
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Chlorine 
Residual  
AD statistic 3180 
TTHM 
production 
Gamma 
scale 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
shape 53.6 54.5 53.9 54.0 54.4 54.5 53.9 53.2 54.3 
AD statistic 19.1 
THAA 
production 
Gamma 
scale 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
shape 113 112 111 113 114 111 112 113 113 
AD statistic 10.1 
 
 
Table 11 Critical AD Statistics of Theoretical Weibull Distribution for Different 
Significance Levels, a. 244 
a 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 
AD critical statistic 0.637 0.757 0.877 1.038 
 
 
 
Figure 29 Fit Comparison for Motors 
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Figure 30 Probability Plot for Motors 
 
 
Figure 31 Fit Comparison for PVC Pipes 
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Figure 32 Probability Plot for PVC Pipes 
 
 
Figure 33 Fit Comparison for Electronics 
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Figure 34 Probability Plot for Electronics. The probability plot of the Triangular fit is 
plotted to show an example of a non-linear and therefore poor fit. 
 
 
Figure 35 Fit Comparison for Iron Pipes 
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Figure 36 Probability Plot for Iron Pipes. The probability plot of the Triangular fit is plotted to 
show an example of a non-linear and therefore poor fit. 
 
 
Figure 37 Fit Comparison for Chlorine Residual Under Best-Case Operating Conditions 
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Figure 38 Probability Plot for Chlorine Residual Under Best-Case Operating Conditions 
 
Figure 39 Fit Comparison for Chlorine Residual Under Worst-Case Operating 
Conditions—Gamma 
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Figure 40 Fit Comparison for Chlorine Residual Under Worst-Case Operating Conditions -
- Exponential 
 
Figure 41 Probability Plot for Chlorine Residual Under Worst-Case Operating Conditions 
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Figure 42 Fit Comparison for THM Production 
 
 
Figure 43 Probability Plot for TTHM Production 
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Figure 44 Fit Comparison for THAA Production 
 
Figure 45 Probability Plot for THAA Production 
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A.4.3 Projection of Failure Calculation Method 
A.4.3.1 Physical Component Failure: Failure Rate Method 
The failure distributions were integrated to attain rate of failure. The component failure 
rates are calculated using the failure rate method, which is the rate of instantaneous 
failure immediately after its current age, given that the component has survived to its 
current age 146,147 as shown in equations 31 - 33. This method was used to calculate 
failure rates of motors, electronics, and pipes.  
 lim∆J→. Pr	(𝑇 < 𝑡 + ∆𝑡| 𝑇 > 𝑡)/∆𝑡 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚∆J→.[𝐹(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡)]/∆𝑡1 − 𝐹(𝑡) (31) 
 
 ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡)𝑅(𝑡) (32) 
 𝐹𝑜𝑟	𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙: ℎ(𝑡) = 	𝛼𝛽 𝑡𝛽¨?% (33) 
 
 
where h(t) is the instantaneous failure rate, t is the current age of the component, Dt is an 
incremental time period, f(t) is the probability of failure of a component within the time 
period, and R(t) is the reliability or chance of component survival up until its current age, 
a is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, and b is the scale parameter of the 
Weibull distribution.  
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A.4.3.2 Probability of Water Quality Non-Compliance Method 
Parameters of probability distribution functions from output Monte Carlo simulation were 
used in Excel to calculate failure as either exceeding the EPA maximum threshold 
regulation or being below an EPA minimum threshold regulation. The TTHM formation 
distribution were used to calculate the cumulative probability that a concentration from 
the distribution would be above the EPA regulated threshold of 80 µg/L for TTHMs.148 
Therefore, P(x> 80 µg/L) was calculated. The EPA regulation for THAAs is 60 µg/L148 
so the probability that P(x> 60 µg/L ) was calculated. The chlorine residual distributions 
were used to calculate the probability that a concentration from a sampling station would 
be undetectable according to the EPA regulation. 149  Therefore, the P(x<0.0175 mg/L) 
was calculated based on the average detectable limit of monitoring equipment. 241,242    
 
The cumulative distribution functions of the Weibull distribution used to calculate 
probabilities are shown in Equation 34.  
 
𝑃(𝑥) = ©1 − 𝑒?ª«¬, 	𝑖𝑓	𝑃(𝑥 < 𝑋)𝑒?ª«¬, 𝑖𝑓	𝑃(𝑥 > 𝑋) (34) 
 
 
A.5 Modeling Failure Cascades to Service Outages: System Failure Laws 
To model component failures leading to systemic failures stochastically, “AND” and 
“OR” logic gates were used to denote the parallel and series behavior within the system, 
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based on standard reliability engineering methods.147 The laws of probability translate 
this logic into quantitative probabilities.  
 
As shown in equation 35, a system failure rate “can be calculated by summing up the 
failure rates of all individual components” assuming a series behavior of the system146.  
This equation was used to calculate pumping unit, pumping station, water outage from 
pumping station outage in WDS, water outage from pumping station outage in WTP, 
overall water outage from pumping station, water outage from iron pipe break in WTP, 
water outage from iron pipe break in WDS, water outage from PVC pipe break in WTP, 
water outage from PVC pipe break in WDS, and overall water outage from pipe break.  
ℎ®(𝑡) =¯ℎ;°;±% (𝑡) (35) 
 
The probability that A and B occur simultaneously (corresponding to AND gates or joint 
probabilities) is shown in Equation 36.147 This equation was used to estimate the 
probability of simultaneous types of water outages.  𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵) (36) 
The probability of either A or B occurring (corresponding to OR gates and the union of 
probabilities) is shown in Equation 37.147 This equation was used to estimate the 
probability of water quality non-compliance from either TTHM production or chlorine 
residual decay.  𝑃(𝐴 ∪ 𝐵) = 𝑃(𝐴) + 𝑃(𝐵) − 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵) (37) 
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A.6 Projected Increases in Service Outages: Failure Percent Increases 
 
Table 12 shows the resulting increase in failure rates in the period of 2020-2050 for all 
components and outage events in Phoenix, Las Vegas, and the case study system. 
 
Table 12  Failure Percent Increases 
Component/
Event 
Phoenix-Las Vegas Average over Maximum Temperature Ranges 
 
Mean 
Percent 
Increase 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Greatest 
Difference in 
Expected 
Failures 
Between Best 
and Worst 
Operating 
Conditions 
Greatest 
Difference 
in Failure 
Rate 
Percent 
Increase 
Under Good 
Operations 
Percent 
Increase 
Under Bad 
Operations 
Motors 92% 9% 2 1% 102% 83% 
Electronics 76% 4% 2 1% 71% 80% 
Pumping 
Units 
72% 12% 5 2% 62% 82% 
Pumping 
Stations 
76% 15% 3 3% 62% 91% 
PVC pipe 10% 0.2% 0 0.0% 10% 10% 
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Iron pipe 
WDS 
52% 12% 0 0.0% 40% 65% 
Iron pipe 
WTP 
76% 8% 0 0.0% 68% 83% 
TTHM 
Production 
17% 10% 45 64.3% 27% 7% 
Chlorine 
decay at 
station 
53% 36% 41 59% 17% 90% 
Water 
Outage from 
Pipe Break 
10% 3% 22 1% 7% 13% 
Water 
Outage from 
Pump 
Station 
Outage 
76% 15% 14 15% 62% 91% 
Water 
Quality 
Non-
Compliance 
17% 0.40% 55 79% 17% 17% 
Any 
Pumping 
Station 
Outage - 
25% 2% 89 2% 25% 25% 
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Water Main 
Break - 
Water 
Quality 
Non-
Compliance 
Simultaneou
s Pumping 
Station 
Outage - 
Water Main 
Break - 
Water 
Quality 
Non-
Compliance 
105% 5% 6 0% 103% 107% 
Simultaneou
s Pumping 
Station 
Outage - 
Water Main 
Break 
95% 21% 6 0% 74% 116% 
Simultaneou
s Pumping 
Station 
106% 17% 32 20% 89% 123% 
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Outage - 
Water 
Quality 
Non-
Compliance 
Simultaneou
s Water 
Main Break 
- Water 
Quality 
Non-
Compliance 
29% 3% 23 1% 26% 32% 
 
 
A.7 Model Uncertainty  
An exploration of the model’s sensitivity to the important model assumptions 
(that were not characterized as parameters with ranges and probability distributions) is 
described in this section. If the information for soil and pipe parameters were made 
available to model the water temperature inside underground pipes, the modeled water 
temperature might decrease,142,143 causing fewer failures in pipes and water quality. If the 
relationship between degradation of motors and electronics per duration of temperature 
exposure were made available, the current degradation modeled might slightly over-
predict the degradation rate from not considering variations in daily and seasonal 
temperature. When the degradation rate is decreased in the model by 10%, the motor and 
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electronic probabilities of failure have a percent decrease of 0-22%, where the highest 
percent change is associated with the failure rates at the lowest temperatures under the 
worst- case operating conditions, and there is 0% change for all temperatures in the best-
case operating conditions. When the rate of degradation of motors decreases by 10%, the 
probability of motor failure has a percent decrease of 0-13%. When the rate of 
degradation of electronics decreases by 10%, the probability of electronic failure has a 
percent decrease of 0-22%.  Additionally, hind-casted probabilities of motor failure are 
validated by historical failure rates, so current results are reasonable. If component 
redundancy data and spatial and temporal information about the WDS network were to be 
made available for specific utilities, a better estimate of probability of systemic failure 
could be made. Assuming that there is a 50% chance (instead of 100% chance) of an 
inadequate amount of water storage decreases the likelihood of outage from pipe break 
by 50% and an outage from pumping station failure by 50%.  If quantitative relationships 
to describe the effect of water hammer from one component failure causing another 
became available, the frequency of component systemic failure might increase. Lastly, it 
is hard to know what the resulting risk will be when normal structural and operational 
characteristics change overtime from urban expansion, transformative designs, etc.  
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APPENDIX B 
SUPPLIMENTARY INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3 
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B.1 Introduction  
 
 
Figure 46 Perses Modeling Overview 
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Figure 47 Simulation Overview 
 
B.2 Methodology 
B.2.1 Modeling Component Probability of Failure 
The method used to estimate the mean time to failure of various components in this 
system is based off of fixed Weibull curves generated from the model given by [Emily’s 
Paper]. Programmatically this is done by accessing the temperature at surface max at the 
given day from the previously loaded list of temperatures. Once the temperature at a 
certain time step is estimated the corresponding Weibull curve is retrieved from the list of 
Weibull curves previously loaded in. On these curves we match the age of the component 
in years to the age in years on the x-axis, and due to these being cumulative failure 
Weibull curves, are able to estimate a likelihood of failure at this time step with accuracy.  
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B.2.2 Modeling Component States  
Since we estimate the mean time to failure for each component before we estimate the 
failure state, we are able to as accurately as possible determine each components failure 
state at each discrete time step, with some level of “random-ness” factored in. The 
estimation of failure is done by comparing the percent of components that we have 
estimated to be failed under the given conditions versus a random value from a uniform 
distribution ranging from 0 to 1. If the value for the percent of components failing is 
greater than the value obtained from the normal distribution, the given component is 
disabled, and the necessary changes made to the model. 
 
Component repair is handled in a similar fashion as component failure. Once failed, the 
component will be assigned a standard duration for that failure, which models the time to 
repair the outage in the real world. One important aspect to note is that when the 
components return to the functioning state they do so at 100% capacity, meaning that 
there is no period in which they function at a fraction of their total capacity.  
 
B.3 Case Study  
B.3.1 North Marin Input File  
[TITLE] 
North Marin Water District Zone I 
 
[JUNCTIONS] 
;ID               Elev         Demand       Pattern 
 10              147           0.00                        ; 
 15              32           620.00         3             ; 
 20              129           0.00                        ; 
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 35              12.5           1856         4            ; 
 40          131.9     0                         ; 
 50          116.5  0                         ; 
 60              0         0                         ; 
 61              0         0                         ; 
 101              42         189.95         1               ; 
 103             43          133.2         1               ; 
 105             28.5          135.37         1               ; 
 107             22          54.64         1                ; 
 109             20.3          231.4         1               ; 
 111             10         141.94         1               ; 
 113             2         20.01         1               ; 
 115             14          52.1         1               ; 
 117             13.6          117.71         1               ; 
 119             2   176.13   1               ; 
 120             0          0                         ; 
 121             -2          41.63          1               ; 
 123             11          1859         2               ; 
 125             11         45.6         1               ; 
 127             56           17.66         1               ; 
 129             51         0                         ; 
 131             6         42.75         1               ; 
 139             31          5.89         1               ; 
 141             4          9.85         1                ; 
 143             -4.5          6.2          1               ; 
 145             1          27.63         1               ; 
 147             18.5          8.55         1               ; 
 149             16          27.07         1               ; 
 151             33.5          144.48         1               ; 
 153             66.2          44.17         1               ; 
 157             13.1          51.79         1               ; 
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 159             6          41.32         1               ; 
 161             4          15.8          1               ; 
 163             5          9.42         1              ; 
 164             5          0                         ; 
 166             -2         2.6          1                ; 
 167             -5       14.56         1               ; 
 169             -5          0                         ; 
 171             -4          39.34         1               ; 
 173             -4         0                         ; 
 177             8          58.17         1               ; 
 179             8          0                          ; 
 181             8          0                         ; 
 183             11          0                         ; 
 184             16          0                        ; 
 185             16        25.65        1               ; 
 187             12.5          0                          ; 
 189             4          107.92         1               ; 
 191             25          81.9         1               ; 
 193             18           71.31         1               ; 
 195             15.5          0                        ; 
 197             23         17.04         1              ; 
 199             -2          119.32         1               ; 
 201             0.1          44.61         1               ; 
 203             2          4643         5               ; 
 204             21         0                         ; 
 205             21          65.36         1               ; 
 206             1          0                         ; 
 207             9           69.39         1               ; 
 208              16          0                         ; 
 209             -2        0.87         1               ; 
 211             7          8.67         1               ; 
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 213             7          13.94         1               ; 
 215             7          92.19         1               ; 
 217             6          24.22         1               ; 
 219             4          4.32         1              ; 
 225             8          22.8         1               ; 
 229             10.5          64.18         1               ; 
 231             5          16.48         1               ; 
 237             14           15.61        1               ; 
 239             13          44.61         1               ; 
 241             13          0                         ; 
 243             14          4.34         1               ; 
 247             18          70.38         1               ; 
 249             18          0                         ; 
 251             30         24.16         1               ; 
 253             36          54.52         1               ; 
 255             27          40.39         1               ; 
 257             17          0                         ; 
 259             25          0                         ; 
 261             0         0                         ; 
 263             0        0                         ; 
 265             0           0                         ; 
 267             21        0                         ; 
 269             0         0                        ; 
 271             6               0                         ; 
 273             8         0                          ; 
 275             10           0                          ; 
 
 
[RESERVOIRS] 
;ID               Head         Pattern 
 4               220.0                           ; 
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 5               167.0                           ; 
 
[TANKS] 
;ID               Elevation    InitLevel    MinLevel     MaxLevel     Diameter    
 MinVol       VolCurve 
 1               131.9        13.1         0.1   
 32.1         85          0.1                           ; 
 2               116.5        23.5           6.5            40.3           50          
 0.1                           ; 
 3               129.0        29.0         4.0   
 35.5        164           0.1                           ; 
 
[PIPES] 
;ID               Node1            Node2            Length       Diameter     Roughness   
 MinorLoss    Status 
 20              3               20               99    
 24            199          0            Open   ; 
 40              1               40               99    
 24            199          0            Open   ; 
 50              2               50               99    
 24           199          0            Open   ; 
 60              4              60               1231   
 24           140          0            Open   ; 
 101              10              101              14200   
 18           110          0            Open   ; 
 103              101              103              1350    16           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 105               101              105              2540   
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 107             105              107              1470    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
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 109             103              109              3940   
 16            130          0            Open   ; 
 111             109              111              2000    12          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 112             115              111              1160    12          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 113             111              113              1680   
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 114             115              113              2000   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 115             107              115              1950    8           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 116             113              193              1660    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 117             263              105              2725    12          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 119             115              117              2180    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 120             119              120              730    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 121             120              117              1870    12          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 122             121              120              2050   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 123             121              119              2000    30           
 141          0            Open   ; 
 125             123              121              1500    30           
 141          0            Open   ; 
 129             121              125              930    
 24           130          0            Open   ; 
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 131             125              127              3240    24          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 133             20              127              785    
 20           130          0            Open   ; 
 135             127              129              900    
 24           130          0            Open   ; 
 137             129              131              6480    16           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 145             129              139              2750    8           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 147             139              141              2050    8           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 149             143              141              1400   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 151             15              143              1650   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 153             145              141              3510    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 155             147              145              2200    12          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 159             147               149              880    
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 161             149              151              1020    8          
  130          0            Open   ; 
 163             151              153              1170    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 169             125              153              4560   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 171             119              151              3460    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
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 173             119              157              2080   
 30            141          0            Open   ; 
 175             157              159              2910   
 30            141          0            Open   ; 
 177             159              161              2000   
 30           141          0            Open   ; 
 179             161              163              430    
 30            141          0            Open   ; 
 180             163              164              150    
 14           130          0            Open   ; 
 181             164              166              490    
 14            130          0            Open   ; 
 183             265              169              590    
 30           141          0            Open   ; 
 185             167              169              60    
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 186             187              204              99.9   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 187             169              171              1270   
 30            141          0            Open   ; 
 189             171              173              50     
 30            141          0            Open   ; 
 191             271              171              760    
 24           130          0            Open   ; 
 193             35              181              30    
 24            130          0            Open   ; 
 195             181              177              30    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 197             177              179              30    
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
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 199             179              183              210    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 201             40              179              1190   
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 202             185              184              99.9    8           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 203             183              185              510    
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 204             184              205             4530   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 205             204              185              1325   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 207             189              183              1350    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 209             189              187              500    
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 211             169              269              646    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 213             191              187             2560    12          
 130          0            Open   ; 
 215             267              189              1230   
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 217             191              193              520    
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 219             193              195              360    
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 221             161              195              2300   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 223             197              191              1150   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
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 225             111              197              2790    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 229             173              199              4000    24           
 141          0            Open   ; 
 231             199              201              630    
 24            141          0            Open   ; 
 233             201              203              120     24           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 235             199              273              725    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 237             205              207              1200   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 238             207              206              450    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 239             275              207              1430    12           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 240             206              208              510    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 241             208              209              885    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 243             209              211              1210   
 16            130          0            Open   ; 
 245             211              213              990    
 16            130          0            Open   ; 
 247             213              215              4285   
 16            130          0            Open   ; 
 249             215              217              1660   
 16            130          0            Open   ; 
 251             217              219              2050    14           
 130          0            Open   ; 
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 257             217              225              1560   
 12           130          0            Open   ; 
 261             213              229              2200   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 263             229              231              1960   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 269             211              237              2080   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 271             237              229              790    
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 273             237              239              510    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 275             239              241              35    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 277             241              243              2200   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 281             241              247              445    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 283             239              249              430    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 285             247              249              10    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 287             247              255              1390   
 10            130          0            Open   ; 
 289             50             255             925    
 10            130          0            Open   ; 
 291             255             253             1100   
 10            130          0            Open   ; 
 293             255              251             1100   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
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 295             249             251             1450   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 297             120             257             645   
  8            130          0            Open   ; 
 299             257             259             350    
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 301             259              263             1400   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 303             257             261             1400    8           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 305             117             261             645    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 307             261             263             350    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 309             265             267              1580    8           
 130          0            Open   ; 
 311             193              267              1170   
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 313             269              189              646    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 315             181             271              260    
 24            130          0            Open   ; 
 317             273              275              2230   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 319             273              205              645    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
 321             163              265              1200   
 30            141          0            Open   ; 
 323             201              275              300    
 12            130          0            Open   ; 
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 325             269              271              1290   
 8            130          0            Open   ; 
 329             61              123             45500   
 30            140          0            Open   ; 
 
 
 
[PUMPS] 
;ID               Node1            Node2            Parameters 
 10             5             10            HEAD 10
 SPEED 1 ; 
 335             60            61             HEAD 335
 SPEED 1 ; 
 
 
[VALVES] 
;ID               Node1            Node2            Diameter     Type Setting     
 MinorLoss 
 
[TAGS] 
 
[DEMANDS] 
;Junction         Demand       Pattern          Category 
 
[STATUS] 
;ID               Status/Setting 
 10             Closed 
 335             Closed 
 
[PATTERNS] 
;ID               Multipliers 
 195 
; 
 1 1.34 1.94 1.46 1.44 0.76 0.92 0.85 1.07 0.96 
 1 1.10 1.08  1.19 1.16 1.08 0.96 0.83 0.79 0.74 
 1 0.64 0.64 0.85 0.96 1.24 1.67 
 
 2 0  0  0  0  0  0.656
 0  0  0 
 2 1.0037 0.988 0.978 0.978 0.98 0.980 0.977 0.981 0.976 
 2 0.986 0.984 0.984 0.975 0.989 1.00 
 
 3 1  1  1  1  1  0.580
 0.580 0  0 
 3 0  0  0.580 0.580 0.580 0.580  0.580  0 
 0 
 3 0  0  0  0  0.580 0.580 
 
 4 0.882 0.919 0.926 0.926 0.964 0.980 0.957 0.992 0.977 
 4 0.983 1.00 0.970 0.980 0.934 0.896 0.872 0.869 0.872 
 4 0.870 0.887 0.876 0.876 0.900 0.898 
 
 
 5 0.956 0.975 0.971 0.986 0.975 0.986 0.984 0.993 1.00 
 5 1.00 0.989 0.993 0.975 0.973 0.958 0.956 0.958 0.960 
 5 0.956 0.951 0.940 0.947 0.962 0.964 
 
 
[CURVES] 
;ID               X-Value      Y-Value 
;PUMP: PUMP: 
 10            0            104 
 10            3000         92 
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 10            6000         63 
;PUMP: PUMP: 
 335            0            200 
 335            8000         138 
 335            14000         86 
 
 
[CONTROLS] 
pump 10 open at time 0 
pump 335 open at time 0 
pump 10 open at time 1 
pump 335 open at time 1 
pump 10 open at time 2 
pump 335 open at time 2 
pump 10 open at time 3 
pump 335 open at time 3 
pump 10 open at time 4 
pump 335 open at time 4 
pump 10 open at time 5 
pump 335 open at time 5 
pump 10 open at time 6 
pump 335 open at time 6 
pump 10 open at time 7 
pump 335 open at time 7 
pump 10 open at time 8 
pump 335 open at time 8 
pump 10 open at time 9 
pump 335 open at time 9 
pump 10 open at time 10 
pump 335 open at time 10 
pump 10 open at time 11 
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pump 335 open at time 11 
pump 10 open at time 12 
pump 335 open at time 12 
pump 10 open at time 13 
pump 335 open at time 13 
pump 10 open at time 14 
pump 335 open at time 14 
pump 10 open at time 15 
pump 335 open at time 15 
pump 10 open at time 16 
pump 335 open at time 16 
pump 10 open at time 17 
pump 335 open at time 17 
pump 10 open at time 18 
pump 335 open at time 18 
pump 10 open at time 19 
pump 335 open at time 19 
pump 10 open at time 20 
pump 335 open at time 20 
pump 10 open at time 21 
pump 335 open at time 21 
pump 10 open at time 22 
pump 335 open at time 22 
pump 10 open at time 23 
pump 335 open at time 23 
pump 10 open at time 24 
pump 335 open at time 24 
pump 10 open at time 25 
pump 335 open at time 25 
pump 10 open at time 26 
pump 335 open at time 26 
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pump 10 open at time 27 
pump 335 open at time 27 
pump 10 open at time 28 
pump 335 open at time 28 
pump 10 open at time 29 
pump 335 open at time 29 
pump 10 open at time 30 
pump 335 open at time 30 
pump 10 open at time 31 
pump 335 open at time 31 
pump 10 open at time 32 
pump 335 open at time 32 
pump 10 open at time 33 
pump 335 open at time 33 
pump 10 open at time 34 
pump 335 open at time 34 
pump 10 open at time 35 
pump 335 open at time 35 
pump 10 open at time 36 
pump 335 open at time 36 
pump 10 open at time 37 
pump 335 open at time 37 
pump 10 open at time 38 
pump 335 open at time 38 
pump 10 open at time 39 
pump 335 open at time 39 
pump 10 open at time 40 
pump 335 open at time 40 
pump 10 open at time 41 
pump 335 open at time 41 
pump 10 open at time 42 
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pump 335 open at time 42 
pump 10 open at time 43 
pump 335 open at time 43 
pump 10 open at time 44 
pump 335 open at time 44 
pump 10 open at time 45 
pump 335 open at time 45 
pump 10 open at time 46 
pump 335 open at time 46 
pump 10 open at time 47 
pump 335 open at time 47 
pump 10 open at time 48 
pump 335 open at time 48 
;link 335 OPEN IF Node 1 BELOW 17.1 
;Link 335 CLOSED IF Node 1 ABOVE 19.1 
;Link 10 CLOSED IF Node 1 BELOW 17.1 
;Link 10 OPEN IF Node 1 ABOVE 19.1 
[RULES] 
RULE 1 
IF TANK 1 LEVEL ABOVE 19.1 
THEN PUMP 335 STATUS IS CLOSED 
AND LINK 10 STATUS IS OPEN 
 
RULE 2 
IF TANK 1 LEVEL BELOW 17.1 
THEN PUMP 335 STATUS IS OPEN 
AND LINK 10 STATUS IS CLOSED 
 
[ENERGY] 
 Global Efficiency   75 
 Global Price        0 
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 Demand Charge       0 
 
[EMITTERS] 
;Junction         Coefficient 
 
[QUALITY] 
;Node             InitQual 
 
[SOURCES] 
;Node             Type         Quality      Pattern 
 
[REACTIONS] 
;Type      Pipe/Tank        Coefficient 
 
 
[REACTIONS] 
 Order Bulk             1 
 Order Tank             1 
 Order Wall             1 
 Global Bulk            0 
 Global Wall            0 
 Limiting Potential     0 
 Roughness Correlation  0 
 
[MIXING] 
;Tank             Model 
 
[TIMES] 
 Duration            48 
 Hydraulic Timestep  1:00 
 Quality Timestep    0:06 
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 Pattern Timestep    1:00 
 Pattern Start       0:00 
 Report Timestep     1:00 
 Report Start        0:00 
 Start ClockTime     12 am 
 Statistic           None 
 
[REPORT] 
 Status              No 
 Summary             No 
 Page                0 
 
[OPTIONS] 
 Units               GPM 
 Headloss            H-W 
 Specific Gravity    0.998 
 Viscosity           1 
 
 
[COORDINATES] 
;Node X-Coord Y-Coord 
10 9.00 27.85 
15 38.68 23.76 
20 29.44 26.91 
35 25.46 10.52 
40 27.02 9.81 
50 33.01 3.01 
60 23.90 29.94 
61 23.71 29.03 
101 13.81 22.94 
103 12.96 21.31 
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105 16.97 21.28 
107 18.45 20.46 
109 17.64 18.92 
111 20.21 17.53 
113 22.04 16.61 
115 20.98 19.18 
117 21.69 21.28 
119 23.70 22.76 
120 22.08 23.10 
121 23.54 25.50 
123 23.37 27.31 
125 24.59 25.64 
127 29.29 26.40 
129 30.32 26.39 
131 37.89 29.55 
139 33.28 24.54 
141 35.68 23.08 
143 37.47 21.97 
145 33.02 19.29 
147 30.24 20.38 
149 29.62 20.74 
151 28.29 21.39 
153 28.13 22.63 
157 24.85 20.16 
159 23.12 17.50 
161 25.10 15.28 
163 25.39 14.98 
164 25.98 15.14 
166 26.48 15.13 
167 25.88 12.98 
169 25.68 12.74 
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171 26.65 11.80 
173 26.87 11.59 
179 25.71 10.40 
181 25.72 10.74 
183 25.45 10.18 
184 25.15 9.52 
185 25.01 9.67 
187 23.64 11.04 
189 24.15 11.37 
191 22.10 14.07 
193 22.88 14.35 
195 23.18 14.72 
197 20.97 15.18 
199 29.42 8.44 
201 30.89 8.57 
203 31.14 8.89 
204 23.80 10.90 
205 29.20 6.46 
206 31.66 6.64 
207 31.00 6.61 
208 32.54 6.81 
209 33.76 6.59 
211 34.20 5.54 
213 35.26 6.16 
215 39.95 8.73 
217 42.11 8.67 
219 44.86 9.32 
225 43.53 7.38 
229 36.16 3.49 
231 38.38 2.54 
237 35.37 3.08 
 204 
239 35.76 2.31 
241 35.87 2.11 
243 37.04 .00 
247 35.02 2.05 
249 35.02 1.81 
251 34.15 1.10 
253 32.17 1.88 
255 33.51 2.45 
257 21.17 23.32 
259 20.80 23.40 
261 20.79 21.45 
263 20.32 21.57 
265 25.39 13.60 
267 23.38 12.95 
269 25.03 12.14 
271 25.97 11.00 
273 29.16 7.38 
275 31.07 8.29 
4 24.15 31.06 
5 8.00 27.53 
1 27.46 9.84 
2 32.99 3.45 
3 29.41 27.27 
 
 
[VERTICES] 
;Link             X-Coord          Y-Coord 
 
 
[LABELS] 
;X-Coord           Y-Coord          Label & Anchor Node 
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[END] 
 
B. 4 Results  
B.4.1 Long-term Increase in Failures in Large-Scale System  
 
Figure 48 Projection Probability Distribution Functions 
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